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The Hard Problem of Consciousness

Year 2021, Volume: 2 Issue: 74, 136 - 167, 15.12.2021

Abstract

Consciousness, which is the most familiar but mysterious part of our lives, has been one of the most lively debates of philosophers for centuries. In recent years, consciousness has been one of the subjects that scientists have spent on the most time thanks to the tools that allow us to research our brain become available. Although there is no agreed-upon definition, when talking about consciousness, it is often referred to subjective experiences. Being conscious means having subjective and qualitative experiences. Our experiences occur with a number of physical processes. We do not have an explanation of what the ontological status of experience, which arises with physical processes but cannot be expressed physically, is. This issue is known as the hard problem of consciousness and is formulated as “how and why subjective experience accompanies with objective physical processes”. In this study, I will focus on the hard problem of consciousness. Firstly, I will discuss thoroughly the details of the problem on consciousness, then will outline the solution proposals in the philosophy of mind, and finally I will evaluate them.

References

  • Kaynaklar Bennett, K. (2008). Exclusion Again, J. Kallestrup and Jakob Hohwy (Ed), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reductive Explanation and Special Science Causation: Oxford, 280-307.
  • Blackmore, S. (2018). Bilinç: Çok Kısa Bir Başlangıç. (Çev.Oğuz Akçelik). İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Block, N. (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Science,18, 227-248.
  • Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing Up To The Problem Of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies,3, 200-219.
  • Chalmers, D. (1995a). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, Scientific American, 273 (6):80-86.
  • Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90
  • Churchland, P. S. (1996). Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(5), 402-408.
  • Churchland, P. S. (2017). Bilinç Üzerine Konuşmalar’ın içinde. (Çev.Seda Akbıyık). (Ed. Susan Blackmore). Küre Yayınları, 67-86.
  • Churchland, P. M. (2017). Bilinç Üzerine Konuşmalar’ın içinde. (Çev.Seda Akbıyık). (Ed. Susan Blackmore). Küre Yayınları, 67-86.
  • Davidson, D. (1970). Mental Events, Philosphy of Psychology. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 207-224.. 
  • Davidson, D. (1993). Thinking Causes, Mental Causation, (Ed.) John Heil and Alfred Mele, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3-18. 
  • Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
  • Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
  • Dennett, D. (2017), Bilinç Üzerine Konuşmalar’ın içinde, (Çev.Seda Akbıyık). (Ed. Susan Blackmore). İstanbul:Küre Yayınları, 101-115. Elgin, M. (2015). Bilimin Doğası Gelişimi ve Öğrenimi. (Ed. Nilgün Yenice). Ankara: Anı Yayıncılık. 
  • Fodor, A. J. (1974). Special Sciences (Or The Disunity of Sciences as a Working Hypothesis). Synthesis, 28 (2), 97-115.
  • Heil, J. (2020). Zihin Felsefesi: Çağdaş Bir Giriş, (Çev.S. Akbıyık ve M. Bilgili). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
  • Hempel, C. (1949). The Logical Analysis of Psychology. Readings in Philosophical Analysis. (Ed. H. Feigl and W. Sellars). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 373–384. 
  • Humphreys, P. (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience, Philosophy of Science. 64, 337-345. 
  • Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly. 32, 127–136.
  • Katz, M. (2019). Jerry Fodor ve Temsilci Zihin Kuramı. (Çev. F. Doruker). Zihin Felsefesi. (Ed. Andrew Bailey). Ankara:Fol Yayınları, 202-222.
  • Kim, J. (1978). Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 149-156.
  • Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
  • Kim, J. (2011). Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press. 
  • Levin, J. (2018). Functionalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/functionalism/>.
  • Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64. 354–361.
  • Lewis, D. (1994). “Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 412–431.
  • McGinn, C. (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?, Mind, 98, 349-66. 
  • Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like To Be a Bat. Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
  • Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a Brain Process?. British Journal of Psychology, 47 (1): 44-50.
  • Priest, S. (2018). Zihin Üzerine Teoriler. (Çev.A. Dereko). İstanbul: Litera Yyayıncılık.
  • Putnam, H. (1967). The Nature of Mental States. Art, Mind and Religion. (Ed W.H. Capitan ve D.D.Meril). Pittsburgh University Press, 223-231 
  • Revonsuo, A. (2010). Consciusness: The Science of Subjectivity, Psychology Press.
  • Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
  • Sayan, E. (2004). Bilinç, Felsefe Ansiklopedisi. (Ed. Ahmet Cevizci). Etik Yayınları, 2, 575-585.
  • Schopenhauer, A. (1974). On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (Ed. D.E. Cartwright, E.E. Erdmann, C. Janaway). Canbridge Uni. Press.
  • Searle, J. (1992). Rediscovery of Mind, MIT Press.
  • Searle, J. (1997). Mystery of Consciousness. London: Granta Books.
  • Smart, J.J.C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes, Philosophical Review, 68, 141-156. 
  • Smart, J. J. C., "The Mind/Brain Identity Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/>.
  • Uexküll, J. V. (1909). Environment (Umwelt) and the inner world of animals. The Foundations of Comparative Ethology, (Ed.Gordon M. Burghardt). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 222–245.
  • Weisberg, J. (2012). The Hard Problem of Consciousness, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

BİLİNCİN ZOR PROBLEMİ

Year 2021, Volume: 2 Issue: 74, 136 - 167, 15.12.2021

Abstract

Yaşamımızdaki en tanıdık fakat bir o kadar da gizemli yanımız olan bilinç yüzyıllardır felsefecilerin en hararetli tartışma konularından biridir. Yakın zamandan itibaren, beynimizi araştırmaya olanak sağlayan araçların elverişli hale gelmesiyle birlikte bilinç bilim adamlarının da en çok mesai harcadıkları konulardan biri olmuştur. Üzerinde uzlaşılan ortak bir tanımı olmasa da bilinçten bahsederken genellikle öznel deneyimlere gönderme yapılır. Bilinçli olmak öznel ve niteliksel bir deneyime sahip olmak anlamına gelir. Deneyimlerimiz bir takım fiziksel süreçlerle birlikte ortaya çıkarlar. Nesnel fiziksel süreçlerle birlikte ortaya çıkan fakat fiziksel olarak ifade edilemeyen deneyimin ontolojik statüsünün ne olduğu hakkında henüz bir açıklamamız yoktur. Bilincin zor problemi olarak bilinen ve “nesnel fiziksel süreçlere öznel deneyim nasıl ve neden eşlik eder?” şeklinde formule edilen bu soru, makale boyunca üzerinde duracağım temel sorudur. Amacım, konuyla ilgili zorluğun detaylarını ortaya koyduktan sonra zihin felsefesindeki çözüm önerilerinin bir taslağını çizmek ve onları değerlendirmektir.

References

  • Kaynaklar Bennett, K. (2008). Exclusion Again, J. Kallestrup and Jakob Hohwy (Ed), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reductive Explanation and Special Science Causation: Oxford, 280-307.
  • Blackmore, S. (2018). Bilinç: Çok Kısa Bir Başlangıç. (Çev.Oğuz Akçelik). İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Block, N. (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Science,18, 227-248.
  • Chalmers, D. (1995). Facing Up To The Problem Of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies,3, 200-219.
  • Chalmers, D. (1995a). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, Scientific American, 273 (6):80-86.
  • Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67-90
  • Churchland, P. S. (1996). Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3(5), 402-408.
  • Churchland, P. S. (2017). Bilinç Üzerine Konuşmalar’ın içinde. (Çev.Seda Akbıyık). (Ed. Susan Blackmore). Küre Yayınları, 67-86.
  • Churchland, P. M. (2017). Bilinç Üzerine Konuşmalar’ın içinde. (Çev.Seda Akbıyık). (Ed. Susan Blackmore). Küre Yayınları, 67-86.
  • Davidson, D. (1970). Mental Events, Philosphy of Psychology. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 207-224.. 
  • Davidson, D. (1993). Thinking Causes, Mental Causation, (Ed.) John Heil and Alfred Mele, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 3-18. 
  • Davidson, D. (2001). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
  • Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
  • Dennett, D. (2017), Bilinç Üzerine Konuşmalar’ın içinde, (Çev.Seda Akbıyık). (Ed. Susan Blackmore). İstanbul:Küre Yayınları, 101-115. Elgin, M. (2015). Bilimin Doğası Gelişimi ve Öğrenimi. (Ed. Nilgün Yenice). Ankara: Anı Yayıncılık. 
  • Fodor, A. J. (1974). Special Sciences (Or The Disunity of Sciences as a Working Hypothesis). Synthesis, 28 (2), 97-115.
  • Heil, J. (2020). Zihin Felsefesi: Çağdaş Bir Giriş, (Çev.S. Akbıyık ve M. Bilgili). İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
  • Hempel, C. (1949). The Logical Analysis of Psychology. Readings in Philosophical Analysis. (Ed. H. Feigl and W. Sellars). New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 373–384. 
  • Humphreys, P. (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience, Philosophy of Science. 64, 337-345. 
  • Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly. 32, 127–136.
  • Katz, M. (2019). Jerry Fodor ve Temsilci Zihin Kuramı. (Çev. F. Doruker). Zihin Felsefesi. (Ed. Andrew Bailey). Ankara:Fol Yayınları, 202-222.
  • Kim, J. (1978). Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 149-156.
  • Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
  • Kim, J. (2011). Philosophy of Mind, Westview Press. 
  • Levin, J. (2018). Functionalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/functionalism/>.
  • Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64. 354–361.
  • Lewis, D. (1994). “Reduction of Mind,” in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 412–431.
  • McGinn, C. (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?, Mind, 98, 349-66. 
  • Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like To Be a Bat. Philosophical Review, 83, 435-450.
  • Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a Brain Process?. British Journal of Psychology, 47 (1): 44-50.
  • Priest, S. (2018). Zihin Üzerine Teoriler. (Çev.A. Dereko). İstanbul: Litera Yyayıncılık.
  • Putnam, H. (1967). The Nature of Mental States. Art, Mind and Religion. (Ed W.H. Capitan ve D.D.Meril). Pittsburgh University Press, 223-231 
  • Revonsuo, A. (2010). Consciusness: The Science of Subjectivity, Psychology Press.
  • Ryle, G. (1949). The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson.
  • Sayan, E. (2004). Bilinç, Felsefe Ansiklopedisi. (Ed. Ahmet Cevizci). Etik Yayınları, 2, 575-585.
  • Schopenhauer, A. (1974). On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (Ed. D.E. Cartwright, E.E. Erdmann, C. Janaway). Canbridge Uni. Press.
  • Searle, J. (1992). Rediscovery of Mind, MIT Press.
  • Searle, J. (1997). Mystery of Consciousness. London: Granta Books.
  • Smart, J.J.C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes, Philosophical Review, 68, 141-156. 
  • Smart, J. J. C., "The Mind/Brain Identity Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mind-identity/>.
  • Uexküll, J. V. (1909). Environment (Umwelt) and the inner world of animals. The Foundations of Comparative Ethology, (Ed.Gordon M. Burghardt). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 222–245.
  • Weisberg, J. (2012). The Hard Problem of Consciousness, https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/
There are 42 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Philosophy
Journal Section Research Articles
Authors

Aslı Üner Kaya 0000-0002-0756-0970

Publication Date December 15, 2021
Submission Date October 11, 2021
Published in Issue Year 2021 Volume: 2 Issue: 74

Cite

APA Üner Kaya, A. (2021). BİLİNCİN ZOR PROBLEMİ. Felsefe Dünyası, 2(74), 136-167.