Abstract
Bu makalede, Trenton Merricks’e (1999)
ait olan ve psikolojik süreklilik ile kişinin devamlılığının sağlandığına dair
herhangi bir görüşün uzamsal devamlılık görüşüyle bağdaşmaz olduğuna dair
argümana odaklanacağım. Bu argümana Rea ve Silver (2000) tarafından yöneltilen
bir itiraz olan; aynı argümanın, paralel bir argüman ile zamansal devamlılık
görüşüne karşı da ortaya konabileceğine ve özgün argümanda ortaya konan nümerik
eşitlik bağıntısının kapsayıcı (generic)
bir bağıntı olmamasının gösterilmediği için argümanın geçersiz olduğuna dair
iddiayı ele alacağım. Merricks’e (2000) göre paralel argümanın geçerli
olabilmesi için ortaya koyduğu ortak-parça (co-part)
bağıntısı yerine ortak-kişi-parçası (co-person-part)
bağıntısına ihtiyacı vardır ve bu bağıntının kapsayıcı olmadığı
gösterilmemiştir. Bu nedenle Merricks’e göre özgün argüman geçersiz ise paralel
argüman da geçersizdir. Ben burada Merricks’in ortaya koyduğu
ortak-kişi-parçası bağıntısının kapsayıcı bir bağıntı olmadığını göstererek
paralel argümanın geçerli olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bunu ortaya koyabilmek için
herhangi bir zamansal devamlılık görüşünün arka planını oluşturması gereken
dört-boyutçuluk ve uzam-zaman görüşlerinden yararlanacağım. En nihayetinde,
Merricks’in uzamsal devamlılık görüşüne dair itirazı geçerli olsun ya da
olmasın benim ortaya koyacağım argüman münhasır bir biçimde zamansal
devamlılığın hiçbir biçimde kişinin devamlılığına dair psikolojik süreklilik
kriteri ile bağdaşmaz olduğunu ortaya koyacaktır.
Keywords
References
- BALASHOV, Yuri (2000a). “Relativity and Persistence”, Philosophy of Science, 67: 549-562.
- BALASHOV, Yuri (2000b). “Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 129-166.
- DAINTON, Barry ve Tim, BAYNE (2005). “Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence”, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 549-571.
- DONNELLY, Maureen (2011). “Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence”, Philosophical Studies, 154(1): 27-51.
- FODOR, Jerry (1974). “Special Sciences: Or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis”, Synthese, 28: 97–115.
- HALES, D. S. Ve T. A. JOHNSON (2003). “Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity”, Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 213-224.
- HUME, David (1739/1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LEWIS, David (1983). “Survival and Identity”, Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, pp. 55-77, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LOCKE, John (1690/1999). “Of Identity and Diversity”, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 311-332, A.B.D., Penn: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- MERRICKS, Trenton (1999). “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 983-997.
- MERRICKS, Trenton (2000). “Perdurance and Psychological Continuity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 195-198.
- MILLER, Kristie (2010). “Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 567-593.
- PARFIT, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- PETERSON, Daniel & Michael SILBERSTEIN (2010). “Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In Defense of the Block Universe”, Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski's Unification of Space and Time, derl. Vesselin Petkov, pp. 209-237, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- PUTNAM, Hilary (1967). “Psychological Predicates”, Art, Mind, and Religion, derl. W. H. Capitan ve D. D. Merrill, pp. 37–48, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- QUINE, W. V. Orman (1960). Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- REA, M. C. & D. SILVER (2000). “Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 185-193.
- SIDER, Theodore (2001). Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- WHITEHEAD, A. NORTH (1920). The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- WILLIAMS, Bernard (1991). “The Self and the Future”, Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues, derl. Daniel Kolak ve Raymond Martin, pp. 181-192, New York: MacMillan Pub. Company.
Abstract
In this
paper, I am going to evaluate Trenton Merricks’s (1999) original argument
claiming that any account of personal identity with psychological continuity is
inconsistent with endurantism. Secondly, I will focus on the parallel argument
proposed by Rea and Silver (2000) which claims that the same argument can be
constructed against perdurantism as well. Additionally, they claim that the
original argument is invalid because Merricks does not argue against the
possibility that the numerical identity relation is a generic relation.
According to Merricks (2000) co-part relation that the parallel argument
proposes for perdurantism should be instead co-person-part relation and the
parallel argument does not show that such a relation is not generic as well.
For this reason, according to Merricks, if his original argument is invalid,
then the parallel argument is also invalid. Here, I am going to argue that the
co-person-part relation is not a generic relation and for this reason the
parallel argument validly shows the inconsistency between the psychological
continuity analyses of personal identity and perdurantism. By means of this I
will use four-dimensionalism and spacetime accounts which must be the
background assumptions of any account of perdurantism. Ultimately, whether
Merricks’s argument against endurantism is valid or not my argument about
co-person-part relation will exclusively show that in no way perdurantism and
the psychological continuity analyses can be consistent.
Keywords
References
- BALASHOV, Yuri (2000a). “Relativity and Persistence”, Philosophy of Science, 67: 549-562.
- BALASHOV, Yuri (2000b). “Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time”, Philosophical Studies, 99: 129-166.
- DAINTON, Barry ve Tim, BAYNE (2005). “Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence”, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 549-571.
- DONNELLY, Maureen (2011). “Endurantist and Perdurantist Accounts of Persistence”, Philosophical Studies, 154(1): 27-51.
- FODOR, Jerry (1974). “Special Sciences: Or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis”, Synthese, 28: 97–115.
- HALES, D. S. Ve T. A. JOHNSON (2003). “Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity”, Philosophical Quarterly, 53: 213-224.
- HUME, David (1739/1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LEWIS, David (1983). “Survival and Identity”, Philosophical Papers Vol. 1, pp. 55-77, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- LOCKE, John (1690/1999). “Of Identity and Diversity”, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 311-332, A.B.D., Penn: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- MERRICKS, Trenton (1999). “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 983-997.
- MERRICKS, Trenton (2000). “Perdurance and Psychological Continuity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 195-198.
- MILLER, Kristie (2010). “Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 567-593.
- PARFIT, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- PETERSON, Daniel & Michael SILBERSTEIN (2010). “Relativity of Simultaneity and Eternalism: In Defense of the Block Universe”, Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of Minkowski's Unification of Space and Time, derl. Vesselin Petkov, pp. 209-237, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- PUTNAM, Hilary (1967). “Psychological Predicates”, Art, Mind, and Religion, derl. W. H. Capitan ve D. D. Merrill, pp. 37–48, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- QUINE, W. V. Orman (1960). Word and Object, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- REA, M. C. & D. SILVER (2000). “Personal Identity and Psychological Continuity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 185-193.
- SIDER, Theodore (2001). Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- WHITEHEAD, A. NORTH (1920). The Concept of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- WILLIAMS, Bernard (1991). “The Self and the Future”, Self & Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues, derl. Daniel Kolak ve Raymond Martin, pp. 181-192, New York: MacMillan Pub. Company.
Details
| Journal Section | Research Article |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | November 30, 2017 |
| Submission Date | November 11, 2017 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2017 Volume: 5 Issue: 2 |
e-ISSN: 2148-5232