Abstract
Декарт утверждает, что можно сомневаться в существовании всего воспринимаемого, но нельзя сомневаться в своем собственном существовании. По его мнению, существование вещей вне нас не воспринимается непосредственно нашими чувствами, а, напротив, основывается на некоем виде вывода. Кант же считает, что если считать сомнительным существование вещей, выводимых таким образом, то сделать вывод, что существование внешних явлений также основано на выводе, является логической ошибкой. По Канту, логическая ошибка в аргументе возникает только тогда, когда средний термин используется двусмысленно в предпосылках. Тем не менее, в этом аргументе Кант не считает выражение "вне нас" двусмысленным, и настоящий средний термин также не двусмыслен. Кроме того, Кант разрабатывает аргумент против скептицизма относительно существования внешнего мира на основе трансцендентального идеализма и эмпирического реализма. По его мнению, если отвергнуть существование вещей вне нас, выходящих за пределы нашего восприятия, и принять только реальность нашего восприятия, то сомнение во внешних вещах также исчезнет. Это происходит потому, что внешние явления также являются формой восприятия и существуют только в нашем сознании. Поэтому, если мы не сомневаемся в себе, то мы не можем сомневаться в вещах в нашем сознании. Однако эпистемологическое различие между нашим сознанием и знанием о внешних вещах, сделанное Кантом, может быть рассмотрено как препятствие для этого решения. Более того, это решение может потребовать принятия реальности восприятия снов и галлюцинаций. Наконец, Кант предполагает существование нумена, не занимающего место в пространстве и не мыслящего, как причину нашего восприятия, и принимает его как причину нашего сознания. Однако то обстоятельство, что эта нуменальная причина лишена качеств результатных феноменов, может рассматриваться как несоответствие в философии Канта.
References
- Allison, H. A. (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ameriks, K. (2000). Kant’s Theory of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bird, G. (1973). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Descartes, R. (2008). Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies. Çev. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Findlay, J. N. (1981). Kant and Transcendental Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goldman, A. (2012). Kant and The Subject of Critique. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Guyer, P. (2006). Kant. London/New York: Routledge.
- Hartnack, J. (2001). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Çev. M. Holmes Hartshorne. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Heidemann, D. (2021). Kant and the forms of realism. Synthese, 198(13), S3231-S3252.
- Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Çev. Paul Guyer ve Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
- Kemp S., N. (2003). A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melnick, A. (2009). Kant’s Theory of the Self. New York: Routledge.
- Paton, H. J. (1936). Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience. Cilt: 2. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Powell, C. T. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Strawson, P. F. (2007). The Bounds of Sense. London: Routledge.
- Stuart, J. D. (1975). Kant’s Two Refutation of Idealism. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. 6(3), 29-46.
Abstract
Descartes duyulur her şeyin varlığından şüphe edebileceğini fakat kendisinin varlığından şüphe edemeyeceğini iddia eder. Çünkü ona göre kendimizin dışındaki şeylerin varlığı duyularımız tarafından doğrudan algılanmaz aksine bir tür çıkarıma dayanır. Buna karşı Kant, varlığı çıkarıma dayalı olan şeylerin şüpheli olduğundan hareketle dış görünüşlerin varlığının da çıkarıma dayalı olduğundan dolayı tüm dışımızdaki şeylerin şüpheli olduğu sonucunun çıkarsanmasını mantıksal bir yanlış çıkarım olarak görür. Kant’a göre bir çıkarımda mantıksal yanlış ise ancak orta terimin öncüllerde çift anlamlı kullanılmasından dolayı meydana gelir. Bununla birlikte Kant’ın bu çıkarımda çift anlamlı gördüğü “dışımızda” ifadesi, orta terim olmadığı gibi gerçek orta terim de çift anlamlı değildir. Kant ayrıca dış dünyanın varlığına yönelik şüpheciliğe karşı da transandantal idealizm ve empirik realizme dayalı bir argüman geliştirir. Buna göre eğer dışımızdaki şeylerin algımızın ötesindeki varlıkları reddedilir ve sadece algımızın gerçekliği kabul edilirse, dışımızdaki şeylere karşı şüphecilik de ortadan kaldırılmış olur. Çünkü dışımızdaki görünüşler aynı zamanda bir algı olarak sadece bizim bilincimizde vardır. Bu nedenle kendimizden şüphe etmiyorsak bilincimizdeki şeylerden de şüphe edemeyiz. Bununla birlikte Kant’ın bilincimiz ile dışımızdaki şeylerin bilgisi arasında epistemolojik bakımdan yaptığı ayrım bu çözümün önünde bir engel olarak görülebilir. Dahası bu çözüm, rüyaların ve halüsinasyonların da algısal gerçekliğini kabul etmeyi gerektirebilir. Son olarak Kant, algımızın nedeni olarak uzayda yer kaplamayan ve düşünmeyen bir numenin varlığını çıkarsar ve onu bilincimizin nedeni olarak da kabul eder. Fakat bu numenal nedenin sonuçtaki niteliklerden yoksun olması, Kant için tutarsızlık olarak görülebilir.
References
- Allison, H. A. (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ameriks, K. (2000). Kant’s Theory of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bird, G. (1973). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Descartes, R. (2008). Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies. Çev. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Findlay, J. N. (1981). Kant and Transcendental Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goldman, A. (2012). Kant and The Subject of Critique. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Guyer, P. (2006). Kant. London/New York: Routledge.
- Hartnack, J. (2001). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Çev. M. Holmes Hartshorne. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Heidemann, D. (2021). Kant and the forms of realism. Synthese, 198(13), S3231-S3252.
- Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Çev. Paul Guyer ve Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
- Kemp S., N. (2003). A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melnick, A. (2009). Kant’s Theory of the Self. New York: Routledge.
- Paton, H. J. (1936). Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience. Cilt: 2. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Powell, C. T. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Strawson, P. F. (2007). The Bounds of Sense. London: Routledge.
- Stuart, J. D. (1975). Kant’s Two Refutation of Idealism. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. 6(3), 29-46.
Abstract
Descartes claims that he can doubt the existence of everything sensible, but he cannot doubt his own existence. Because, according to him, the existence of things outside ourselves is not directly perceived by our senses, on the contrary, it is based on some sort of inference. On the other hand, Kant sees as a logically wrong inference to conclude that all external things are doubtful because the existence of external appearances is also based on inference, based on the fact that things whose existence is based on inference are doubtful. According to Kant, a logical fallacy in an inference occurs only because the middle term is used with a double meaning in the premises. However, the expression "outside us", which Kant sees as ambiguous in this inference, is not a middle term, nor is the real middle term ambiguous. Kant also develops an argument based on transcendental idealism and empirical realism against skepticism towards the existence of the external world. Accordingly, if the existence of external things beyond our perception is denied and only the reality of our perception is accepted, skepticism towards external things will be eliminated. Because the appearances outside of us also exist only in our consciousness as a perception. Therefore if we do not doubt ourselves, we cannot doubt the things in our consciousness. However, Kant's epistemological distinction between our consciousness and the knowledge of things outside of us can be seen as an obstacle to this solution. Moreover, this solution may require accepting the perceptual reality of dreams and hallucinations as well. Finally, Kant deduces as the cause of our perception, the existence of a noumenon that does not occupy space and does not think and accepts it as the cause of our consciousness. But the fact that this noumenal cause lacks the qualities in the result can be seen as an inconsistency for Kant.
References
- Allison, H. A. (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Ameriks, K. (2000). Kant’s Theory of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bird, G. (1973). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Descartes, R. (2008). Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies. Çev. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Findlay, J. N. (1981). Kant and Transcendental Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Goldman, A. (2012). Kant and The Subject of Critique. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Guyer, P. (2006). Kant. London/New York: Routledge.
- Hartnack, J. (2001). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Çev. M. Holmes Hartshorne. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Heidemann, D. (2021). Kant and the forms of realism. Synthese, 198(13), S3231-S3252.
- Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Çev. Paul Guyer ve Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
- Kemp S., N. (2003). A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Melnick, A. (2009). Kant’s Theory of the Self. New York: Routledge.
- Paton, H. J. (1936). Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience. Cilt: 2. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Powell, C. T. (1990). Kant’s Theory of Self-Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Strawson, P. F. (2007). The Bounds of Sense. London: Routledge.
- Stuart, J. D. (1975). Kant’s Two Refutation of Idealism. The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy. 6(3), 29-46.
Details
| Primary Language | Turkish |
|---|---|
| Subjects | Ontology |
| Journal Section | Articles |
| Authors | |
| Publication Date | September 30, 2023 |
| Submission Date | July 5, 2023 |
| Published in Issue | Year 2023 Issue: 59 |
