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Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar

Year 2023, Issue: 2, 34 - 52, 19.10.2023

Abstract

Epistemoloji rasyonel inançların felsefi analizini konu edinmesi nedeniyle gerekçelendirme edimine merkezi bir önem atfeder. Gerekçelendirme kişinin bir önermeye inanmak için gerekçeye sahip olunmasını sağlayan koşul veya koşullar dizisinin tespit edilmesini içerir. İnançlarımızın birçoğunun çıkarımsal olmayan gerekçelerinin bulunduğu şeklindeki ılımlı/yanılırcı temelci perspektifle uyum sağlayan bir gerekçelendirme teorisi olarak Michael Huemer tarafından ortaya konan görüngüsel muhafazakarlık ilkesi, bu türden bir koşulu tanımlar. GM formülasyonuna göre eğer S’ye p olarak görünüyorsa, çürütücü etmenlerin yokluğunda S’nin p’ye inanmak için en azından bir dereceye kadar gerekçesi vardır. Görüngüler ise rasyonel inanç oluşturmanın olanağına referans veren, inanç ve inanma eğilimlerinden farklı, sui generis deneyimlerdir. Bu makalede görüngülerin doğasından hareketle GM’yi tanıttım ve GM’ye yöneltilen eleştirilerin bir bölümünü tartıştım. Yer verdiğim eleştiriler, GM’nin irrasyonel/tehlikeli görüngüler ve bilişsel nüfuzdan kaynaklanan inançları dahi gerekçelendirilmiş kabul ettiği, GM teorisyenlerinin görüngülere gerekçelendirme edimi özelinde biçtiği başat rolün ve inanç ve görüngüler arasında öngörülen farklılıkların abartılı olduğu itirazlarını içerir. Bana göre sözü edilen eleştirilerin hiçbiri, GM’nin reddedilmesini gerektiren argümanlar içermez. Görüngülerin epistemik gerekçelendirmedeki rolünü tesis eden GM veya benzeri bir ilkeyi kabul etmek için temel neden ise bunun şüphecilik haricindeki olası alternatiflerinin belirsizliğidir. Çünkü eğer görüngüler, inanç oluşturmada epistemik faile rehberlik edecek göstergeler ise bu, failin ilgili göstergelerden yoksun olduğunda herhangi bir şeye rasyonel olarak inanmasının olanaksızlaşacağı anlamına gelir.

References

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  • Bergmann, M. (2013a). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 154-178). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Bergmann, M. (2013b). Externalist Justification and the role of seemings. Philosophical Studies 166: 163-84.
  • BonJour, L. (2004). In Search of Direct Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, 349-367.
  • Brogaard, B. (2013). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 270-289). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Chudnoff, E. (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153: 313-33.
  • Chudnoff, E. (2013). Intuition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Conee, E. (2013). Seeming Evidence. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 52-68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cullison, A. (2010). What Are Seemings?. Ratio 23(3): 260–74.
  • Dretske, F. (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 40(3), 363–378.
  • Gettier, E. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.
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  • Hasan, A. (2013). Phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 162(2), 119–141.
  • Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
  • Huemer, M. (2006). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(2), 147–158.
  • Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 30-55.
  • Huemer, M. (2013a). Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 328-350). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Huemer, M. (2013b). Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience. Philosophical Studies 162, 741-748.
  • Huemer, M. (2019). Phenomenal Conservatism. Erişim tarihi: 15. 01. 2023, https://iep.utm.edu/phen-con/ Littlejohn, C. (2011). Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52, 35-48.
  • Lycan, W. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Markie, P. (2005). The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification. Philosophical Studies 126, 347-373.
  • McCain, K. & Moretti, L. (2021). Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Moretti, L. (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis 75 (2): 296-309.
  • Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Pryor, J. (2013). Problems for Credulism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 89-131). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Rogers, J. & Matheson, J. (2011). Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists. Philosophical Studies 152 (1): 55-80.
  • Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11, 108–128.
  • Siegel, S. (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162, 697-722.
  • Skene, M. (2013). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 163, 539-559.
  • Sosa, E. (1998). Minimal Intuition. M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Ed.). Rethinking Intuition içinde (ss. 257–70). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Steup, M. (2013). Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism’s Dilemma?. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 135-153). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Swinburne, R. (2001). Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Tolhurst, W. (1998). Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly, 35(3), 293–302.
  • Tooley, M. (2013). Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 306-327). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Tucker, C. (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24, 529-545.
  • Tucker, C. (2013). Seemings and Justification: An Introduction. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 1-29). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Year 2023, Issue: 2, 34 - 52, 19.10.2023

Abstract

References

  • Bealer, G. (2000). A Theory of the A Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 81: 1-30.
  • Bergmann, M. (2013a). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 154-178). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Bergmann, M. (2013b). Externalist Justification and the role of seemings. Philosophical Studies 166: 163-84.
  • BonJour, L. (2004). In Search of Direct Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, 349-367.
  • Brogaard, B. (2013). Phenomenal Seemings and Sensible Dogmatism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 270-289). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Chudnoff, E. (2011). The Nature of Intuitive Justification. Philosophical Studies 153: 313-33.
  • Chudnoff, E. (2013). Intuition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Conee, E. (2013). Seeming Evidence. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 52-68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cullison, A. (2010). What Are Seemings?. Ratio 23(3): 260–74.
  • Dretske, F. (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 40(3), 363–378.
  • Gettier, E. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.
  • Goldman, A. (1979). What Is Justified Belief?. G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and Knowledge içinde (ss. 1-23). Dordrecht: Reidel.
  • Goldman, A. (2008). Immediate Justification and Process Reliabilism. Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New Essays içinde (ss. 63–82). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Hanna, N. (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26, 213-221.
  • Hasan, A. (2013). Phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 162(2), 119–141.
  • Huemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Huemer, M. (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
  • Huemer, M. (2006). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition. American Philosophical Quarterly, 43(2), 147–158.
  • Huemer, M. (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, 30-55.
  • Huemer, M. (2013a). Phenomenal Conservatism Über Alles. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 328-350). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Huemer, M. (2013b). Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience. Philosophical Studies 162, 741-748.
  • Huemer, M. (2019). Phenomenal Conservatism. Erişim tarihi: 15. 01. 2023, https://iep.utm.edu/phen-con/ Littlejohn, C. (2011). Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism. Analytic Philosophy 52, 35-48.
  • Lycan, W. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Markie, P. (2005). The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification. Philosophical Studies 126, 347-373.
  • McCain, K. & Moretti, L. (2021). Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Moretti, L. (2015). Phenomenal Conservatism. Analysis 75 (2): 296-309.
  • Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Pryor, J. (2013). Problems for Credulism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 89-131). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Rogers, J. & Matheson, J. (2011). Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists. Philosophical Studies 152 (1): 55-80.
  • Russell, B. (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11, 108–128.
  • Siegel, S. (2013). The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience. Philosophical Studies 162, 697-722.
  • Skene, M. (2013). Seemings and the Possibility of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 163, 539-559.
  • Sosa, E. (1998). Minimal Intuition. M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Ed.). Rethinking Intuition içinde (ss. 257–70). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Steup, M. (2013). Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism’s Dilemma?. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 135-153). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Swinburne, R. (2001). Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Tolhurst, W. (1998). Seemings. American Philosophical Quarterly, 35(3), 293–302.
  • Tooley, M. (2013). Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 306-327). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Tucker, C. (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24, 529-545.
  • Tucker, C. (2013). Seemings and Justification: An Introduction. C. Tucker (Ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism içinde (ss. 1-29). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
There are 40 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Continental Philosophy
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Utku Ataş

Publication Date October 19, 2023
Published in Issue Year 2023 Issue: 2

Cite

APA Ataş, U. (2023). Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi(2), 34-52.
AMA Ataş U. Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar. KFD. October 2023;(2):34-52.
Chicago Ataş, Utku. “Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış Ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, no. 2 (October 2023): 34-52.
EndNote Ataş U (October 1, 2023) Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 34–52.
IEEE U. Ataş, “Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar”, KFD, no. 2, pp. 34–52, October 2023.
ISNAD Ataş, Utku. “Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış Ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi 2 (October 2023), 34-52.
JAMA Ataş U. Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar. KFD. 2023;:34–52.
MLA Ataş, Utku. “Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış Ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar”. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi, no. 2, 2023, pp. 34-52.
Vancouver Ataş U. Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar. KFD. 2023(2):34-52.