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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

REVOLT IN GREECE AFTER THE GREEK DEBACLE IN ASIA MINOR*

Mekki ULUDAĞ**

Abstract

This paper delves into a comprehensive analysis of the 1922 rebellion in Greece, focusing on the significant events surrounding the Greek monarch's abdication and the subsequent uprising led by a military delegation against the established government. The primary objective of this research is to shed light on the underlying causes and the far-reaching consequences of this historical event. As a result of the rebellion the Greek king abdicated and a new government was established in Greece. Despite this, the rebellion continued to spread and resulted in the rebels taking over the government. The overarching objective of this research is to explicate the underlying causes and the far-reaching consequences of the rebellion. The primary sources underpinning this investigation are gleaned from American, British, and Turkish press. Employing a comparative content analysis method, the initial step involved the identification and classification of relevant news and articles. These were thereafter categorized based on the principle of impartiality. Subsequently, the selection of news and articles to be included within the purview of the study was meticulously undertaken. Ultimately, a comprehensive evaluation was conducted through content comparison. The potential insights derived from this study encompass an understanding of the impact of the rebellion on both the Greek government and its military forces.

Keywords: Revolt in Greece, September 1922, Greek Debacle, Asia Minor, Revolutionary Committee.

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^{**} Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Dicle Üniversitesi, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Tarih Bölümü, (mekki.uludag@dicle.edu.tr), (Orcid: 0000-0001-6557-7917).

KÜÇÜK ASYA'DAKİ YUNAN HEZİMETİNDEN SONRA YUNANİSTAN'DA İSYAN

Öz

Bu makale, Yunanistan'daki 1922 isyanının kapsamlı bir analizini ele almakta, Yunan hükümdarının tahttan çekilmesi ile sonuçlanan önemli olaylara ve ardından askeri bir delegasyonun yerleşik hükümete karşı önderlik ettiği ayaklanmaya odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırmanın temel amacı, bu tarihi olayın altında yatan nedenlere ve geniş kapsamlı sonuçlarına ışık tutmaktır. İsyan sonucunda Yunan kralı tahttan çekilmiş ve Yunanistan'da yeni bir hükümet kurulmuştur. Buna rağmen isyan yayılarak devam etmiş ve isyancıların yönetimi ele geçirmeleri ile sonuçlanmıştır. Çalışma, isyanın nedenlerini ve sonuçlarını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Araştırmanın ana kaynakları Amerikan, İngiliz ve Türk basınıdır. Bu araştırma için karşılaştırmalı içerik analizi yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Öncelikle konuyla ilgili haber ve yazılar tespit edilmiş, ardından tarafsızlık ilkesine göre tasnif edilmiştir. Sonrasında araştırma kapsamında değerlendirilmesine karar verilen haber ve yazılar belirlenmiştir. Son olarak içerik karşılaştırması yapıldıktan sonra bir değerlendirme yapılmıştır. Çalışmanın olası bulguları, isyanın Yunan hükümeti ve ordusu üzerindeki etkilerinin ortaya konulmasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yunanistan'da İsyan, Eylül 1922, Yunan Hezimeti, Batı Anadolu, İhtilal Komitesi.

Introduction

The Greek army started an occupation in Western Anatolia months before the assignment of the peace agreement between the Allies and the Ottoman State. The Greek forces initially occupied İzmir and some other towns around it. Since the very first day of the Greek occupation, it was clear that the occupation was a wrong decision and that Greece was a wrong choice for such a task. There was no consensus among the Allies about the occupation, and due to that fact, Italy and France were not happy with the occupation. Warnings came from the French authorities such as the great French commander Foch regarding the occupation, indicating that the occupation was a big mistake and that the Greeks should evacuate Anatolia as soon as possible.¹ The Greek occupation spread over a wide area and the Greek forces overtly announced that they would be going to occupy all of Western Anatolia including Ankara.² On the other hand, Turks established their civil and military administration in most parts of Anatolia and were ready to face the Greek occupation forces.³ In the very first encounters between the two sides, the Greeks suffered defeats against Turkish regular forces in the first quarter of 1921. However, the Greek army got more reinforcements from mainland Greece and started a great offensive in July 1921 which ended with huge gains for the Greeks. Kütahya, Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar were occupied by the Greek Forces and the Turkish forces had to retreat up to the Sakarya River.⁴ The Greeks suffered another defeat at the Field Battle of Sakarya and they had to retreat with heavy casualties. The Turks started preparations for a final, decisive offensive the main goal of which was to sweep the Greeks out of Anatolia. The offensive started in August 1922 and ended in a couple of weeks with a debacle for the Greeks.⁵

During the Greek in Western Anatolia as a result of the Turkish Great Offensive, tens of thousands of Greek soldiers were killed or captured. The Greek defeat turned into a rout and in just a couple of weeks, Anatolia was completely freed from the Greek occupation. An army of more than two hundred thousand soldiers evolved into refugees, they left everything behind and had to escape to Greek islands or to mainland Greece. As soon as the first group of the Greek deserters arrived in Greece, some Greek officers blamed the Greek King, the government and the general Staff due to the defeat and they organized protest marches which were attended by thousands. Soon, rebels gained the support of

¹ George Grey Aston, *The Biography of the Late Marshal Foch*, MacMillan Company, New York 1929, p.435.

² A. Beaumont, "Turco-Greek War" The Daily Telegraph, London, July 26, 1921, p.9.

³ Peter Kincaid Jensen, "Greco-Turkish War 1920-1922" International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 10, No. 4, November 1979, pp.553-565.

⁴ Thomas W. Gallant, Modern Greece, London, Arnold, 2001, p.142.

⁵ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.254.

the Greek land and navy forces and they acted on Athens. Protesters demanded the abdication of the king and the dissolution of the government.⁶ Anger, hunger and epidemics were common in Athens. Therefore, many Athenians joined the uprising and they supported the newly established Revolutionary Committee. The king abdicated, the government resigned, and the revolutionaries easily mastered the situation in the country. There were articles in the press full of exaggeration of Colonel Gonatas, leader of the Greek revolution, who claimed him as a handsome man with an intellectual face and a pleasant smile.⁷ Those were futile efforts to create a new leader from the ashes of a ruined army. All the extraordinary efforts and exaggerated praises failed. Gonatas, although formed a government, failed to restore order in the country. The committee had to call Venizelos once more, as Venizelos was seen one of the most experienced Greek statesmen and the one who could ensure unity in government, who was abroad as a fugitive. The Greek invasion of Asia Minor cost a lot to Greece. Along with the loss of tens of thousands of Greek soldiers, a new era of turmoil started in Greece. The turmoil would turn into chaos, and finally a civil war for decades.

1. The Beginning of the End for the Greeks in Asia Minor; Turkish Great Offensive

Following the Battle of Sakarya, the Turks meticulously prepared for a decisive offensive against the Greeks, who were in a defensive position. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's well-executed military campaign elevated him to a prominent position.⁸ The Greek defeat was a significant catastrophe due to poor leadership and staff work. Kemal concealed his intentions until three days before the offensive, and the Turks' extraordinary leadership shone through in their success.⁹ On August 23, 1922, extensive reconnaissance was carried out, with a focus on İzmit and Menderes. The Greeks gathered their reserves in Kütahya, believing it to be the target, which hindered their ability to reinforce Afyon. Mustafa Kemal Pasha initiated his offensive on August 26, 1922.¹⁰ The Greek Second Division guarding Afyon put up a strong resistance but was nearly destroyed. The Greek Fourth Division fled under pressure.¹¹ Afyon fell to the Turkish forces on August 27, 1922. Simultaneously, the Turkish Cavalry Corps

⁶ William Miller, Greece, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1928, p.69-70.

^{7 &}quot;Col. Gonatas Says Revolt was Natural Sequel of Misgovernment" *The New York Herald*, New York, October 02, 1922, p.2.

⁸ For more information about the Turkish leadership and strategy during Turkish Great Offensive against the Greek forces in August 1922, See Lord Kinross, *Ataturk: A Biography* of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1965, pp.351-364.

⁹ Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770-1923, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1972, p.237.

¹⁰ For the explanation made by Mustafa Kemal Pasha about the Great Offensive see Kemal Atatürk, *Nutuk*, Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı, 1927, p.482-488. For the English version of Nutuk see Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, *The Great Speech*, Ankara, Atatürk Research Center, 2005.

¹¹ Andrew Dalby, *Eleftherios Venizelos: Greece*, London, Haus Publishing, 2011, p.145.

moved between the First and Second Greek Corps, assaulting the vulnerable flank of the Greek Second Corps, which broke and withdrew to Kütahya.¹²

The Greek forces shifted from retreat to flight, leaving behind artillery and vehicles. Turkish cavalry was caught off guard by a Greek flanking maneuver. The Greek First Corps passed through swiftly, and the Second Corps reached Alaşehir, allowing them to reorganize and reach Simav ahead of the cavalry. The Greek First Corps retreated, securing hills around Dumlupinar. The Greek Second Division, led by a capable general, defended the railway, while the Third Division continued to retreat with some support. Despite a favorable position, Greek forces, facing numerical odds, withdrew to Uşak after two days, ultimately losing to the Turkish forces.¹³

The final battle took place near Uşak, with the main Greek army far from the area.¹⁴ Gediz fell to Turkish forces on August 30, splitting the Greek southern army from the northern one at Simav. The Greeks had to withdraw through Bursa and Mudanya, losing most of their heavy artillery, wheeled transport, and cargo during the retreat. Despite minimal personnel losses, the Greek army's defeat was attributed to a combination of broken morale and weak leadership, with Greek officers retreating and unit commanders hiding.¹⁵ Greece lost all its claims in Asia Minor, and its army disintegrated into a chaotic retreat, leaving destruction in its wake.¹⁶ İzmir became a city of terror, with refugees and deserters fleeing amid chaos.¹⁷ The Greek army's withdrawal left Western Anatolia in ruins, and the catastrophe had a profound, lasting impact on Greece's political and military life for decades.¹⁸

¹² Edward S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece 1821-1956, New York, Greenwood Press, 1977, p.145.

¹³ For more information about the Greek debacle see Michael Llewellyn Smith, Ionian Vision, Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp.284-312. Also see Nilüfer Erdem, Yunan Tarihçiliği Gözüyle Anadolu Harekâtı (1919-1923), İstanbul, Derlem Yayınları, 2010.

¹⁴ Peter Kincaid Jensen, "The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922" International Journal of Middle East Studies, Nov. 1979, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 562-563.

¹⁵ Doros Alastos, *Venizelos; Patriot, Stateman, Revolutionary*, London, Lund Humphries, 1942, p.220.

¹⁶ David H. Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War, New York, Longman, 1995, p.4.

^{17 &}quot;Graphic Story of the Greek Debacle, Demoralized Army, a Headlong Flight, Turkish Generalship" *The Daily Telegraph*, London, September 12, 1922, p.11. For more information about the final days of the Greeks in İzmir see Bilge Umar, *İzmir'de Yunanlıların Son Günleri*, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1974.

¹⁸ Constantine Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1969, p.35.

2. First Greek Troops in Greece and the Outbreak of the Revolt

Unrest arose when Greek troops, returning from Asia Minor, showed mutinous sentiments in Piraeus. They defied orders and landed there instead of the designated islands.¹⁹ Around nine thousand soldiers arrived from İzmir and were promptly disarmed and sent home. The Greek press called for Venizelos' return, while King Constantine addressed the nation, urging courage and patience during trying times.²⁰ The Greek soldiers at İzmir were furious, men and officers were chanting in favour of Venizelos as they marched through the streets. They were uncontrollable, according to Greek High Commissioner of İzmir Aristeidis Stergiadis, who asserted that the whole Greek army was insane.²¹

On August 28, 1922, Petros Protopapadakis' government resigned and King Constantine tasked Nikolaos Kalogeropoulos with creating a new ministry. Instead, a new Greek cabinet was formed under the leadership of Nikolaos Triantafyllakos, who was the Greek High Commissioner in İstanbul for about a year.²² Together with Premiership, Triantafyllakos also assumed the Ministry of War and Navy. Optaxias was Minister of Finance, Boussios was Minister of the Interior, Kalogeropoulos was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Mansas was Minister of National Economy.²³ According to a report from Athens sent to London, right before the establishment of the new Greek Cabinet, some members of the previous cabinet of Protopapadakis requested Kalogeropoulos to approach the King and suggest that he should abdicate for the sake of the country in favour of his son Crown Prince George.²⁴ Constantine's crown was not in jeopardy, according to George Streit, chairman of the Greek delegation in the League Assembly and a former minister of foreign affairs. Streit claimed that most Greeks did not hold him accountable for their defeat in Asia Minor. He predicted that the Venizelists would fail if they try to use the current troubles in their county as justification for a coup d'état.²⁵

Former Greek Premier Eleftherios Venizelos, vacationing in St. Moritz, contemplated a trip to Paris to discuss Athens' situation with political contacts. His potential return to power in Greece was a subject of speculation.²⁶ The internal situation in Greece grew turbulent following their defeat in Asia Minor.

^{19 &}quot;Returning Greek Troops" The Guardian, London, September 11, 1922, p.9.

^{20 &}quot;Greeks Returning Mutinous in Defeat Cheer Venizelos" The New York Times, New York, September 11, 1922, p.1.

^{21 &}quot;Greek Debacle, Army Out of Hand" The Daily Telegraph, London, September 11, 1922, p.9.

^{22 &}quot;Yunan İhtilalcileri Yeni Bir Kabine Yaptılar" Vakit, September 30, 1922, p.2.

^{23 &}quot;New Greek Cabinet Formed" The New York Times, New York, September 11, 1922, p.3.

^{24 &}quot;New Greek Premier" The Daily Telegraph, London, September 11, 1922, p.9.

²⁵ Edwin L. James, "Beaten Greek Army in Mutinous Mood" The New York Times, New York, September 11, 1922, p.3.

^{26 &}quot;Venizelos Going to Paris to Confer on Greek Crisis" *The New York Times*, New York, September 11, 1922, p.1.

The new ministry lacked real power, and there were calls to recall Venizelos. Meanwhile, the Greek radical Right advocated for a military dictatorship led by General Metaxas, and General Constantinopoulos pledged to impose strict press restrictions. Greece was on the edge, with widespread anger prevailing.²⁷

Immediately upon its establishment, the new Greek Cabinet was sworn in. There wasn't a single representative of the former Premier Venizelos' party in the ministry. At the upcoming peace conference with the Turks at Lausanne, the new Greek premier said that his approach would be to strictly uphold the national interests and maintain order in Greece. The Greek Crown Prince who had been living in the Romanian city of Bucharest returned to Greece.²⁸ According to a statement made by the Venizelist headquarters in Paris, Eleftherios Venizelos would only accept to return to Greece if King Constantine abdicates and the Triantafyllakos Cabinet resigns. Before Venizelos would accept that he was the people's choice for head of government, it was urged that a public demand, as determined by a referendum, must be made.²⁹ There were persistent rumours throughout Greek communities in Switzerland that King Constantine would soon arrive in Lucerne. He had made Lucerne his base of operations during his previous exile. Although some Swiss publications stated they would much rather prefer to have his room than him on Swiss land, the Swiss government was unable to raise any legitimate concerns about his being there.³⁰ The members of the Greek colonies in England held a meeting in London and made a statement in which they demanded the immediate abdication of King Constantine, and the return of Venizelos to power as soon as possible. According to them, Venizelos was the only man who could rehabilitate Greece and save it from further disasters. Telegraphs with similar demands from some Greek communities from different parts of the world were read during the meeting.31

According to his allies in Paris, former Greek Premier Venizelos, whose return to power was the subject of a significant movement in Athens, would never agree to collaborate with King Constantine. As long as Constantine was in power, Venizelos would reject all contact with the Greek State, but he also would not turn down help in ridding the nation of what he calls Constantine's mistakes. In his own position, Venizelos would travel to Rome and London to draw attention to the fact that the Kemalist win in Anatolia was not only a catastrophe for Hellenism but also would imperil the interests of the Great Powers in the Near East, including France. Venizelos placed a strong emphasis on the dangers of a well-organized Ankara Government that would be in

^{27 &}quot;Situation in Athens" The Daily Telegraph, London, September 12, 1922, p.11.

^{28 &}quot;New Greek Cabinet in Office" The New York Times, New York, September 12, 1922, p.3.

^{29 &}quot;Venizelos Awaits Events" The New York Times, New York, September 12, 1922, p.1.

^{30 &}quot;King Constantine" *The Daily Telegraph*, London, September 13, 1922, p.9.

^{31 &}quot;Constantine's Abdication and Venizelos's Return" *The Guardian*, London, September 13, 1922, p.8.

constant contact with Moscow and Berlin and the repercussions of a Turkish invasion of Thrace. According to his friends, the former premier could serve his nation better in Paris and London than in Athens at the moment.³²

After İzmir was liberated from Greek occupation by Turkish troops, Aristeidis Stergiadis, who was appointed as Ionia High Commissioner by the Greek government, left İzmir embarked on the Greek warship Lemnos and went to İstanbul.³³ When Stergiadis arrived in İstanbul, he was greeted by a hostile group of Greeks. They accused him of being a traitor, saying that he disarmed the Greeks while giving the Turks ammunition. He boarded a Rumanian boat bound for Constanza while under the protection of the Allied police.³⁴ Based on a report from Athens, there was unrest on the Island of Mytilene caused by agitators assisted by some demobilized Greek reservists. During the unrest, some shops were ransacked while the Greek Government tried to take measures to impose the order.³⁵ Several well-known Turkish agitators were said to have travelled to Bulgaria to incite the populace against the Greeks, while prominent Venizelist commanders were said to have departed Constantinople for Thrace to launch an anti-royalist effort.³⁶ Out of the 250.000 Greek troops in the army, only 20.000 were believed to still be serving. Those were in Thrace, a region whose territorial retention by Greece was significantly questioned. Greece was struggling to feed its population due to the influx of thousands of migrants from Asia Minor each day as well as a shortage of wheat in the country. If international assistance was provided swiftly, it might save thousands of people from suffering hunger. Approximately 200.000 people had already arrived and had been haphazardly dropped on the Grecian coast or landed on the Aegean islands, where food and water were in short supply. According to certain estimations, 500.000 migrants would likely be brought to Greece. Unsatisfactory conditions existed in the Greek treasury. The forced public loan accomplished by halving the value of paper money had essentially been used up.³⁷

3. The Abdication of King Constantine and The Coup d'état in Greece

The riot, triggered by all the distasteful developments, broke out in two Greek quarters; part of the Greek army and fleet brought from İzmir to the Aegean islands of Chios and Mytilene and the Greek army forces in Salonika.³⁸ Forces in Chios were embarked for mainland Greece while an aeroplane from

^{32 &}quot;Venizelos to Stay Away, Will Never Consent to Work with Constantine" *The New York Times*, New York, September 15, 1922, p.2.

^{33 &}quot;Greek High Commissioner Leaves Smyrna" The Guardian, London, September 11, 1922, p.9.

^{34 &}quot;Only Ruins Left in Smyrna" The New York Times, New York, September 17, 1922, p.2.

^{35 &}quot;Steamers Wanted" *The Daily Telegraph*, London, September 14, 1922, p.8.

^{36 &}quot;Mutinous Greeks Deserting in Thrace" The New York Times, New York, September 17, 1922, p.2.

^{37 &}quot;Greece Short of Food" The New York Times, New York, September 22, 1922, p.2.

^{38 &}quot;Düşman Memleketinde Neler Oluyor" Hakimiyet-i Milliye, September 27, 1922, p.1.

the Island of Mytilene dropped leaflets, signed by Colonel Gonatas on the name of a section of the Greek Army, on Athens mainly demanding the abdication of the King together with the formation of a new government and the strengthening of the Thracian frontier along with some other demands by the Revolutionary Committee.³⁹ The Greek Revolution started a bloodless one at the beginning. The Greek Fleet announced that every officer and member of the crew was with the committee. The movement led by Colonel Gonatas, who was known as not being a Venizelist, progressed in all directions while the Greek Cabinet was in continuous meeting sessions for a long time. Hours after the revolutionary movement started, the Government, which had taken power days ago, resigned. The battleships of Kilkis and Lemnos together with nine torpedo boat destroyers and some seaplanes at Mytilene declared that they were on the side of the revolution. There was great excitement in Athens, thousands of Athenians were outside. After a long period of hesitation and meeting between the King and members of the Greek Revolutionary Committee, the King accepted to sign the decree of abdication in favour of his son as the new Greek King.⁴⁰

The revolutionary committee landed from the battleship Lemnos at Phaliron and led a part of the army triumphantly into Athens after the revolutionaries set up camp on the grounds of the royal palace a few hours after its landing. Astonishing sights heralded the committee's arrival. The *black horseman* leaders, Colonel Gonatas and Colonel Plastiras⁴¹ found it challenging to go forward amid the streets teemed of people. In the midst of delirious applause from the crowd, flowers were thrown in front of them and garlands were forcibly tied around their necks. The same welcome was extended to the troops.⁴²

The committee decided that both Venizelists and non-Venizelists would have ministerial positions, as long as the latter supported the Entente. They sent a telegram to Venizelos in France, thanking him and inviting him to represent Greece at the peace conference and with major European nations. In Athens, people roamed freely as the threat of conflict waned. Constantine released all political prisoners, including republicans. Republicans held anti-monarchy gatherings, with sporadic celebratory shots. The Revolutionary Committee called for law and order and assured the safety of all Greek citizens. Venizelos, having arrived in Paris from Deauville, convened a meeting to decide if he would accept the invitation to represent Greece in the peace conference and with the Allies.⁴³ In order to take on the responsibility of defending Greece's interests

^{39 &}quot;Atina'da Askerlerin İhtilali ve Bir Darbe-i Hükümet Teşebbüsü" Vakit, September 28, 1922, s.1.

^{40 &}quot;Tino Loses Throne, Greek Fleet and Army Revolt" *Evening Standard*, London, September 27, 1922, p.1.

⁴¹ Miller, *Greece...*, p.69.

⁴² Maxwell Henry Hayes Macartney, *Five Years of European Chaos*, New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1923, p.200.

^{43 &}quot;Revolutionists Control Athens" The Union Daily Times, South Carolina, September 30, 1922, p.1.

in the Allies' capitals, Venizelos accepted the revolutionary committee's request and telegraphed his assent to Athens. He quickly went for London after sending the message in the hopes of meeting the British foreign secretary.⁴⁴

Colonel Gonatas at Mytilene, General Plastiras at Chios and General Koutzis at Salonika had issued proclamations demanding the dissolution of the Chamber and election for a Constituent Assembly. The Cabinet gave its resignation to the King which was signed by him immediately, and the King added that he had no intention of any kind of resistance against the revolutionary movement which might result in a civil war in Greece.⁴⁵ The coup, the object of which was to oust Constantine and unite Greece,⁴⁶ was supported by all the Greek political parties including Venizelists. The Revolutionary Triumvirate, which was led by Gonatas, Plastiras and Phocas,⁴⁷ took a firm stand against proposals made by the Allies about Thrace and decided to wage an aggressive war to retain Thrace.⁴⁸

Colonel Gonatas, a leader in the Greek revolutionary movement, clarified that he had no intention of becoming a military dictator. He stated that leadership was offered to him by fellow officers who joined the revolution, and he credited the success of the movement to their efforts. Gonatas attributed Greece's failure in Asia Minor to mismanagement, prompting the return of Greek officers to remove the king and the government. The revolutionary government initially arrested those they believed responsible for the defeat, detaining them on Aegean Sea islands.⁴⁹ Commander-in-chief of the Greek Army General Hadjianestis had been arrested and an amnesty had been granted for political offenders except for ministers and public officials.⁵⁰ No matter how Gonatas tried to convince everyone that he was not going to be a dictator, shortly after becoming prime minister of the newly established Greek government, he became known⁵¹ and mentioned as a dictator.⁵² This was the first military coup in the history of Greece which would lead to a long period of coups and instabilities for many years to come.⁵³ According to Colonel Gonatas, the Greek King Constantine was an

^{44 &}quot;Venizelos Accepts Invitation Extended by Committee" *The Union Daily Times*, South Carolina, September 30, 1922, p.1. For more information about Greek diplomacy at Lausanne see Çağla Derya Tağmat, *Lozan Konferansı'nda Yunan Diplomasisi 1922-1923*, İstanbul, Libra Kitap, 2018.

^{45 &}quot;Political Revolution with Military Revolt" The Guardian, London, September 28, 1922, p.9.

^{46 &}quot;Yunanistan'ı Ateş-i İhtilal Kavuruyor" Hakimiyet-i Milliye, September 29, 1922, p.1.

^{47 &}quot;Generals Govern Greece" *Chicago Tribune*, Illinois, September 29, 1922, p.2.

⁴⁸ Otis Swift "Rebels March on Athens as King Abdicates" *Chicago Tribune*, Illinois, September 28, 1922, p.1.

^{49 &}quot;New Greek Regime Asks Entente's Aid" *The New York Herald*, New York, October 02, 1922, Vol.87, No:33, p.2.

^{50 &}quot;Greek General Arrested" Birmingham Gazette, Birmingham, October 12, 1922, p.1.

^{51 &}quot;Notes" *Time*, New York, October 22, 1923, Vol.2, No:8, p.9. But in fact, the military committee was acting exactly like a dictatorial regime. Erdem, Ibid, p.513.

^{52 &}quot;Greece, Republicans vs. Royalists" *Time*, New York, November 19, 1923, Vol.II, No:12, p.11.

⁵³ Constantine P. Danopoulos, *Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece*, North Carolina, Documentary Publications, 1985, p.21.

embarrassment to the Greeks due to his lack of capability of establishing good relations with the Entente countries. By saying this, Gonatas was trying to hide the real reason for abdication which was the Greeks' defeat against the Turks. Gonatas claimed that they removed the king from his throne in an honourable way and sent him to America.⁵⁴ The uprising easily took over Athens, then spread to other regions without resistance. Power shifted from the government to the Revolutionary Committee, which aimed to wage war in Thrace, form a provisional government for elections, and invite Venizelos to oversee Greece's foreign policy.⁵⁵

At the request of the Revolutionary Committee, the Greek king Constantine fled the country, and his son George II took over as the new Greek King.⁵⁶ The Revolutionary Committee, representing the nation's sentiment, met with the new Greek King. Colonel Gonatas conveyed their desire to remove those responsible for past calamities and barriers to cooperation with allies. They celebrated a peaceful victory and the unity of previously divided political parties working together for the country's well-being.⁵⁷ In response, King George praised the success of the revolutionary movement and believed in its sincere goals. He affirmed his father's genuine abdication and commitment not to reclaim the throne. Colonel Gonatas raised concerns about obstructive royalists but warned against any backlash. The King emphasized the finality of the change in the Crown, with the ex-King's agreement. Colonel Gonatas, initially described as a military dictator shortly after the coup, had this conversation with the King,⁵⁸ asked for persuasion of the royalists not to create any obstacles to the revolution. Gonatas claimed that the committee had no intention of direct governing the country and that it would confine itself only to making recommendations to the new government.59

It was soon understood that the outrage that the public felt toward the government that had brought about such a catastrophe in Greece could not be stopped by George in any way. Plastiras, Gonatas, and Hadjikyriakos, the leaders of the uprising, took control of the government and issued a royal invitation for King George to depart the realm. King George eventually left Greece after being dethroned and in March 1924, Greece became formally a republic.⁶⁰ The Revolutionary Committee successfully took the control of Greece and put

^{54 &}quot;King is Consulted, Leader Appeals to U. S." *The New York Herald*, New York, October 02, 1922, Vol.87, No:33, p.2.

^{55 &}quot;Rebel Board in Control Over Greece" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, September 29, 1922, p.1.

^{56 &}quot;Veliaht Yorgi Kral İlan Edildi" Vakit, September 29, 1922, s.1.

^{57 &}quot;Greek Revolutionaries Meet New King, Firm Stand Against Reaction" *The Guardian*, London, October 02, 1922, p.11.

^{58 &}quot;Will Fight Reactionaries" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, October 10, 1922, p.7.

⁵⁹ Otis Swift "Keep Watch on Ministers" *Chicago Tribune*, Illinois, October 03, 1922, p.2.

⁶⁰ William Hardy McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath*, New York, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947, p.25. For the main reasons of deportation of King George see "Greece Fired!" *Time*, New York, December 31, 1923, Vol. II, No. 18, pp.12-13.

order everywhere in the country. However, all was not well for the committee; thousands of refugees were flooding Athens from many places although there was no place for more of them.⁶¹ Death from hunger was common among the Greeks, tens of thousands of Greeks were on their way from İstanbul to Athens to escape from the Turkish forces. The country was in certain need of a loan and there was no sign of obtaining it yet. There were big problems that needed to be solved and there was not even a government in Greece. Besides, the Allies agreed on an armistice at Mudanya with Turkey by which they promised to take Thrace from Greece to give it to Turkey which was the first big blow for the committee of which Thrace was an important object.⁶² Support of Greeks to the revolution continued. A huge demonstration, attended by more than one hundred thousand people, was held in front of the Palace in Athens to show support for the revolution. Revolutionary chiefs Gonatas and Plastiras gave a speech, in which they called for the unification of Greeks and that they had no intention of keeping the power for long. After the meeting, thousands of the Greeks walked through the streets shouting in favour of Venizelos and claimed death for culprits referred to as the imprisoned royalist cabinet members.63

4. Court Martial, The Trial of the Six and The Execution of War-Time Leaders

A Commission of Inquiry was established by The Revolutionary Committee to inspect the reasons for the Greek disaster in Asia Minor and to identify those who were responsible for the Greek defeat. The commission prepared its report and submitted it to the committee. The committee decided to arrest and imprison those who were responsible for the Greek debacle in Asia Minor according to the report of the commission. Based on that decision, some military and civil staff were arrested and imprisoned until their trial that they were accused of treason to Greece. The court-martial made it clear in a statement that although Greece was breaking away from alliances, they did their utmost to consolidate Constantine in order to hold office under him.⁶⁴ They were executed for knowingly hiding from the populace the danger involved in King Constantine's return to the throne. By using terrorist tactics, they silenced any opposition from the populace, worked with General Hadjianestis to plan a fraudulent attack on Constantinople, and ultimately enabled the enemy to launch their offensive and bring down the Greek front in Asia Minor, therefore wilfully handing over a sizable portion of the army to the opposition. They were consequently found guilty of plotting to commit high treason in line with

⁶¹ Adamantios Polyzoides "Greece in the Agonies of Revolutionary Conflict" *Current History*, December 1924, Vol. 21, No. 3, p.397.

^{62 &}quot;Allies Tackle Job of Ousting Thrace Greeks" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, October 13, 1922, p.3.

⁶³ Otis Swift "100,000 Greeks Cheer Success of Revolution" *Chicago Tribune*, Illinois, October 24, 1922, p.9.

^{64 &}quot;Yunan Hezimetinin Mesulleri" Tasvir-i Efkâr, October 04, 1922, p.3.

a number of provisions of the military and criminal codes.⁶⁵ Six former army commanders and cabinet members who were found guilty of high treason in relation to the Greek military tragedy in Asia Minor were put to death. The men who had been found guilty, five Greek Ministers and the Greek Commanderin-Chief were shot in Athens following their trial by the revolutionary courtmartial for their roles in the Greek disaster in Asia Minor.⁶⁶

King Constantine faced accusations of cowardice in the Commission of Inquiry's report, but due to constitutional limitations, no legal action was recommended. Responsibility was shifted to those who had been killed. The ex-king led the army in Asia Minor but left when the battle turned, despite advice to the contrary. He was also accused of appointing ineffective military officials, dismissing experienced commanders, and favoring deserter officers. The king introduced financial aid for deserters, mutineers, and offenders. General Hadjianestis, known for mental instability, was chosen to lead the army. The report also accused the government of covert actions and terrorizing peaceful individuals through threats, attacks, and killings.⁶⁷ Dimitrios Gounaris, who was prime minister from April 1921 to May 1922, was among those killed. Nikolaos Stratos succeeded Gounaris as prime minister in May 1922. Petros Protopapadakis, a former prime minister, served as Finance Minister in the last Gounaris Cabinet. General Hadjianestis was the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Army in Ionia during the Greek catastrophe. Following the ministers' execution, the court-martial verdict was announced. Gounaris, Baltazzis, Theotokis, Protopapadakis, Stratos, and General Hadjianestis received capital punishment and were executed by firing squad. Goudas and General Stratigos received life sentences. Additionally, financial penalties were imposed on the military offenders. On the last day of the trial, a considerable crowd gathered, including well-to-do ladies interested in the fate of the accused ministers and its impact on Greece's relationship with Great Britain. The inmates appeared fatigued, and their families displayed intense worry. The judges read the verdict in silence, creating a tense atmosphere.⁶⁸

According to transmission from Athens, General Hadjianestis was gravely humiliated before the Greek ministers faced the firing squad. His sword was destroyed, and his decorations and rank insignia were torn off his outfit. Before they were shot, all the men received communion. The graveyard was where the dead were delivered to family members. The dispatch also notes that British Minister Lindley⁶⁹ persisted in trying to win the condemned men's release

^{65 &}quot;Execution of Greek ex-Ministers, Condemned for Treason" *The Daily Telegraph*, London, November 29, 1922, p.11.

⁶⁶ For a detailed account of the trial see Smith, *Ionian....*, p.312.

^{67 &}quot;Constantine Accused of Cowardice" *Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury*, Liverpool, November 29, 1922, p.7.

^{68 &}quot;Greek Executions, Death Quickly After Trial" The Daily Mail, Hull, November 29, 1922, p.5.

⁶⁹ British Ambassador to Greece Francis Lindley, has reported imported developments

right up until the very end.⁷⁰ He twice went to the Foreign Office even though it was widely known that several of the accused individuals would get death sentences. At midnight, he also paid a visit to Colonel Plastiras, the revolutionary leader.⁷¹ Arresting the politicians and military leaders who were believed to be responsible for the devastating loss of the Greek army was one of the first actions of the government that came into power following the Greek revolution and the second abdication of King Constantine.⁷² After the Revolutionary Committee's failed attempt to execute prisoners, a group of young Greek officers planned a counterrevolution, which was discovered. The committee, aware of public sentiment, moved political detainees to Averoff prison for safekeeping. Reports of incompetence and corruption among army commanders in Asia Minor surfaced. General Hadjianestis, one of the executed, was reportedly suffering from hallucinations during the Greek retreat, having spent time in a mental institution. Some claimed that no one could board transports during the retreat due to the absence of the admiral in control of the port, who was snipe hunting.⁷³

The death of former Greek Prime Minister Gounaris and five other Greek ministers had a significant impact on British diplomatic circles. The British government, despite Gounaris not being an ally during the war, made efforts to save him. They considered the idea of one political party putting political rivals on trial for their lives as barbarous and feared the negative consequences of actual executions, especially on the complex Near Eastern issue. It was expected that these actions would lead to fear and outrage in Greece, potentially isolating the country and making it more challenging to obtain foreign loans, pushing it closer to mass unrest. In response, the British government offered friendly advice to the new Athenian government, but it was disregarded. Additionally, a tribunal was formed to try Prince Andrew, the younger brother of former King Constantine, but it couldn't act against him due to strong criticisms and warnings from France, England, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Romania, all emphasizing that no harm should be done to the prince.⁷⁴

The Revolutionary Committee invited Eleftherios Venizelos and Alexandros Zaimis to form a government and to take the leadership of Greece, but the invitation was rejected by both of the men. The committee had a country in ruins. There were no friends for Greece, no resources to meet the economic

regarded to the revolt in Athens to the British Foreign Secretary in his report, see *Documents* on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Ed: W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, M. E. Lambert, First Series, Volume XVIII, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1972, pp.127-131.

^{70 &}quot;British Intervention" The Guardian, London, November 29, 1922, p.7.

^{71 &}quot;To Secure Clemency, Britain Continued Her Efforts Up to Last Moment" *The Gazette,* Montreal, November 29, 1922, p.1.

^{72 &}quot;İhtilalciler Tevkifata Başladılar" Yeni Şark, September 29, 1922, p.1.

^{73 &}quot;War Scandals, Delusions of a Mad Greek General" *Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury*, Liverpool, November 29, 1922, p.7.

^{74 &}quot;Andrew will be Degraded Before Army" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, December 03, 1922, p.1.

needs of the country, and more than one million refugees had flooded in.⁷⁵ Furthermore, there was internal political confusion and a severe split between Venizelists and royalists for many years. There was the real leader behind the scenes as being Plastiras while Gonatas emerged as the new Premier of Greece.⁷⁶ The executions got harsh critics from England and the Greek Premier Krokidas had to resign right after the execution of wartime premiers and ministers.⁷⁷ Gonatas and Plastiras practically ruled Greece until 1924.⁷⁸

Conclusion

The ambitious vision of the Megali Idea, a dream cherished by many Greeks, led their statesmen into a perilous venture – the ill-fated occupation of Western Anatolia. This endeavor was based on historical claims that overlooked the centuries-long absence of Greek rule in the region. Contrary to the preconceived notions of the Greek leaders, Asia Minor was home to a predominantly Muslim population, casting doubt on the feasibility of the Greek occupation. The Greek foray into Anatolia was characterized by a disturbing pattern of occupation and invasion. The repercussions were profound, resulting in the forced displacement of millions and the tragic loss of tens of thousands of lives. The occupation sowed the seeds of animosity between Muslims and non-Muslims, making peaceful coexistence untenable. Subsequently, a massive population exchange was deemed necessary after the war, further upending the social fabric of the region.

The Greek occupation of Anatolia also left a dark stain due to the numerous atrocities committed by the Greek forces. In a humiliating defeat, a Greek army of two hundred thousand soldiers suffered a decisive setback at the hands of Turkish forces, compelling their withdrawal from Turkey. This turning point triggered a revolt within Greece, directed against the Greek government and the General Staff of the Greek army. The revolutionists succeeded in toppling the government and exiling the king. The new Greek government, established by the revolutionists, managed to prevent immediate chaos in the country. However, this revolt marked only the beginning of a tumultuous era in Greece's history, one defined by instability, coups, and civil strife. The failure of the Greek occupation in Anatolia exacted a heavy toll, and it took Greece decades to restore order within the nation. This turbulent period served as a form of retribution for Greece's actions in Anatolia, illustrating the interconnectedness of historical events and their lasting impact on a nation's trajectory.

⁷⁵ C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece, A Short History, London, Chatham, 1998, p.209.

⁷⁶ Otis Swift "Greece Wants 40 Million to Save National Unity" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, December 15, 1922, p.6.

^{77 &}quot;British Protest Causes Fall of Greek Ministry" Chicago Tribune, Illinois, November 26, 1922, p.7.

^{78 &}quot;Greece" America; A Catholic Review of the Week, January 12, 1924, p.295.

The Greek revolutionary committee caused a radical change in Greek politics, and as a result, an unstable period that lasted for years began in Greece. However, not only was chaos prevented in Greece, but Greek interests were defended by committee representatives at the Lausanne Conference. There was a relationship between the revolutionaries and Venizelos based on mutual need. Although Venizelos was needed as an experienced and unifying statesman, the administration of the country was not fully left to him.

The 1922 rebellion left indelible scars on Greek society. The loss of life and the devastating consequences of the war, coupled with the political upheaval and social unrest, had a profound impact on the nation's collective psyche. This period of turmoil served as a stark reminder of the fragility of peace and the importance of responsible leadership. By analyzing the underlying causes, the unfolding events, and the far-reaching consequences of this historical event, we gain a deeper understanding of the complex political and social dynamics that shaped Greece during this turbulent period. This knowledge serves not only to shed light on the past but also to provide valuable insights for navigating the challenges of the present and shaping a more stable and prosperous future for Greece. This study offers a preliminary analysis of the 1922 rebellion in Greece. Additional research could explore various aspects of this event in greater depth, such as: The role of specific individuals and groups in inciting and leading the rebellion, the impact of the rebellion on the Greek economy and social fabric, the international community's response to the rebellion and its implications for Greece's geopolitical standing.

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APPENDIX

Picture I: A group of Greek troops at the island of Rodosto, disillusioned and disgruntled by the debacle and the withdrawal of the Greek army from Asia Minor, protested King Constantine before their general, pleading for demobilization and calling for a republic.⁷⁹




Picture II: After his abdication, the Greek King Constantine with his wife and their four children in Italy.⁸⁰



^{79 &}quot;After the Greek Debacle: Troops Who Supported Revolution" The Illustrated London News, London, October 07, 1922, p.539.

^{80 &}quot;The Ex-King and Queen of Greece, With four of their children" The Illustrated London News, London, October 07, 1922, p.533.

Picture III: The last party of the Greek soldiers leaving İzmir to the Greek Islands of Aegean.81



Picture IV: The leading figures of the Revolutionary Committee; Colonel Plastiras in the middle indicated by an arrow, together with Colonel Gonatas and Captain Phocas, who were described as the new Dictators of Greece.⁸²




81 "The Evacuation of Smyrna" *The Daily Telegraph*, London, September 21, 1922, p.16.

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Picture V: The new Greek King George II.83



Picture VI: "The fate of piteous Constantine, we finally put his chair on his head"84

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[&]quot;Yeni Yunan Kralı Yorgi" Vakit, September 29, 1922, p.1. "Zavallı Kosti'nin Akıbeti" Güleryüz, October 05, 1922, p.1. 84