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DELEUZE AND INFINITE REPRESENTATION: CONTRADICTION VERSUS SUFFICIENT REASON*


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ABSTRACT

The relationship between Deleuze and Hegel and Deleuze's obvious anti-Hegelianism manifests itself mainly in the *Difference-in-Itself* section of *Difference and Repetition*. The issue in this first part of *Difference and Repetition* consists of the critique of traditional metaphysics as a system of representation. Traditional metaphysics tries to represent existing things, instead of problematising their genesis. It presents them by making them organized and suitable for the human eye. Traditional philosophy does this by subordinating difference to identity. Ultimately, for philosophy, difference is merely a means to guarantee the structure of the representational system based on identity and on harmony. However, Deleuze's philosophy is a system of thought about the origin of the existence of things. Here, difference becomes the constitutive element. At this point, our aim will be to reveal the general structure of various representational systems. Our first subject will be Aristotle's Organic Representational system, in which the limit of beings is well determined. After this system, we will move on to the infinite representational system, where the purpose of the limit is not the restriction but to enable the finite to pass beyond itself. According to Deleuze, the Philosophical systems that are similar to the latter are exemplified by Hegel and Leibniz. Essentially, in this section, Deleuze shows himself to be on the side of Leibniz and criticizes Hegelian dialectics. This criticism here shows that individual and unconscious creation is the basic question at the core of Deleuze's system, which is based on the problem of origin. Deleuze's aim is to build a system of philosophy based on Leibnizian philosophy, purified from old metaphysics defects and a reinterpretation of Kantian experience.


Keywords: Deleuze, Hegel, Leibniz, Aristotle, Representation, Concept, Sufficient Reason.

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DELEUZE VE TEMSİL: ÇELİŞKİ VERSUS YETER SEBEP İLKESİ*


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ÖZ

Deleuze ile Hegel arasındaki ilişki ve Deleuze'ün çok açık olan anti-Hegelciliği kendisini esas olarak *Fark ve Tekrar*'ın *Kendinde Fark* bölümünde gösterir. *Fark ve Tekrar*'ın bu ilk bölümünün tartışma konusu temsil sistemi olarak geleneksel metafiziğin eleştirisidir. Geleneksel metafizik, var olanların kökenini sorun edinmek yerine, onları temsil etmeye çalışır. Onları, düzenli ve insan gözü için uygun hale getirerek sunar. Geleneksel felsefe bunu farkı özdeşliğe tabi kılarak yapar. En nihayetinde felsefe için fark sadece temsil sisteminin özdeşliğe ve uyuma dayanan yapısını garanti etmek için bir araçtır. Oysa Deleuze felsefesi, şeylerin varlığının kökenine dair bir düşünce sistemidir. Fark burada kurucu unsurdur. İşte bu noktada amacımız çeşitli temsil sistemlerinin genel yapısını ortaya koymak olacaktır. Bu sistemler içinde ilk inceleme konumuz Aristoteles'in organik Temsil sistemi olacaktır. Sınırın iyice belirlendiği bu sistemden sonra sınırın amacının sınırlandırmak değil ama sonlunun kendi ötesine geçişini sağlamak olduğu sonsuz temsil sistemine geçeceğiz. Buradaki iki örnek sistem Hegel ve Leibniz'in Felsefe sistemleridir. Esasen bu bölümde Deleuze kendisini Leibniz'den yana taraf olarak gösterir ve Hegelci diyalektiği eleştirir. Buradaki eleştiri de Deleuze'ün kökene yönelik kurulmuş sisteminin özünde bireysel ve bilinçdışı yaratımın önemli olduğunu gösterir. Deleuze'ün amacı da eski metafizikten arınmış bir Leibniz felsefesi ile Kantçı deneyimin yeniden yorumlanmasına dayanan bir felsefe sistemi inşa etmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Deleuze, Hegel, Leibniz, Aristoteles, Kavram, Yeter Sebep İlkesi.

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1. BEING WITHIN THE BORDERS: DELEUZE AND THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION

Mainly, representation emerges as a presentation of the individuated being in a systematic way. This idea of a ready-made being emerges as thought's demand for identity, a demand for a harmonious unity and also for stability. Various metaphysics, which are systems of representation, treat the difference as secondary since they are the presentation of identical beings. Being qua being, the definition of metaphysics as ontology, interrogates the ground of identity, or being as constituted in its plenitude. In this structure, difference has a meaning relative and dependant to identity. Thus, difference is also a useful tool for establishing the identity-based representational system. "Could the difference become a harmonious organism, and relate the determination to other determinations in a form, that is to say in the coherent element of an organic representation?" (Deleuze, 1993, p. 44). Therefore, metaphysics considers difference in relation to a totality within coherence. Apart from this, the structure of Being as something harmonious and organic is grounded on substance.

In short, the individuated thing is the real horizon and the sole ground for the traditional metaphysics. The substance (*ousia*), as that which gives permanence and sameness to this thing, has become the subject of interrogation in Aristotle. By not being a predicate but by being a subject and by being autonomous and separate (being a *tode ti*), by being totality and by being in act, the substance is the sole ground for representation. In short, Aristotelian metaphysics moves from the meanings of being to the unifying and referential meaning of being. The substance is this unifying meaning (Reale, 1990, p. 280).

However, the philosophical aim of Deleuze is based on *difference itself* as the genesis of beings. Where difference is the element that which gives birth to individuated things, the substance is the reason behind the individuated being as the reason of identity for the latter. Thus, the identity is the means and also the end of representation; identity which is the means in that representation is based on it. But it is also the end point because the reason of being of representation is to present the world in its individual shape. In sum, Deleuze's main claim is that the philosophical tradition mediates difference.

The desire to re-present the world precedes the becoming and transformation of the same world. Dating from the Ancient Greeks, transformation and change sacrificed and reduced to a self-identical being (*ousia*) (Beistegui, 2004, p. 38). In short, the individuated thing is the real horizon and the sole ground for the traditional metaphysics. The substance (*ousia*), as that which gives permanence and sameness to this thing, has become the subject of interrogation in Aristotle. Therefore, an ideal and virtual dimension as the ground of production, the site where solid being gains its essence, remains beyond the metaphysical horizon. In contrast, the tendency of thought towards determination, positing the thing in its production beyond the identity of its individual being means: "The difference is this state in which we can speak of THE determination" (Deleuze, 1993, p. 43). Difference is the determination. The new metaphysics of Deleuze is based on this proposition. Then, THE difference is constitutive, where representation means presenting existing world in its identity. To be more precise, the difference is this unilaterality relation; "The Platonists said that the non-One is distinguished from the One, but not the other way around, since the One does not escape from what escapes from it" (Deleuze, 1993, p. 43). Difference is the One that could not be separated from the not-One. It is the ontological ground of Being. In Deleuze we see, instead of a divine universe with clear boundaries, a demonic universe;

It is not being which is divided according to the requirements of representation, but all things which are distributed within it in the univocity of simple presence (the One-All). Such distribution is demonic rather than Divine; because the particularity of demons is to operate in the intervals between the fields of action of the gods, like jumping over barriers or enclosures, blurring properties (Deleuze, 1993, p.54)

The Representation divides Being in accordance with human point of view and frames it in favor of recognition and Aristotle is the best figure of this representational thinking;

Man is not born with knowledge, but he is born with the capacity to acquire it. But the world must cooperate with him if he is to exercise that capacity. (...) The world, for its part, offers man repetition and regularity in his sensory encounters. Through repeated encounters with items in the world, our sensory discriminations develop into memory and then into what Aristotle calls 'experience' (Lear, 2007, p. 2).

In Aristotle, there is a reciprocity between World and Man; the desire to know which belongs to human subject finds its response in the World, because the World has an regularity and repetition. Thus, there should be a division in being which corresponds to human point of view, which is in its essence theological because theological account of the World is itself the completion of human point of view; The God is a law reigning in the World by division and by hierarchy and the metaphysics at the end is theology.

But how can we discern such a law in philosophy? According to Deleuze, Aristotle gives us an example of this law; “Specific difference describes a maximum, a point of harmony, and for it the ideal measure, which is entirely relative to the Greek eye, which has forgotten the meaning of dionysiac ecstasy and metamorphosis” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 48). The specific difference is the place where there is univocity and regularity in being and where the human subject finds himself in his home. The place where determination occurs in its purest meaning, where it is univocal in the Aristotelian sense, is the region where the genus-species relationship emerges.

This region is exactly the universe where thought has awakened from sleep and confidently recognizes its object. With Aristotle, the Being as the path of truth in Parmenides turns into an effort to know, and this seems to be the most important transformation. Conversely, Deleuzian thought develops a perspective outside of a system of knowing, which accentuates the origin of beings, their creation. This point is fundamentally related to the issue of individuation. The general problem of Aristotelian metaphysics, according to Deleuze, is related to the blockage in the problem of individuation, in which individuals themselves become dependent on generality; the generality to which the individual beings are dependant constitutes the system of judgement. Being, in its genus-species relation is only there for the judgement. But we could not know or understand the origin of individuals in their constitution and emergence.

Is it possible to make Being free from the limit that Aristotle has tried to achieve with the genus-species distinction? The Deleuzian problem should be understood in this way. Thus, it is necessary to consider the limitlessness against the limit that has established within the genus-species relationship and also to handle with the individuation problem. This means that Being or the principles of the individuation of all things are prior to being.

In short, this is a thought of the demonic because it contains *hybris*. There is no pyramidal hierarchy that progresses from top to bottom, but there is on the contrary a horizontal axis where hierarchy emerges within the power relations and finally it includes a Heraclitean fluid World. Instead of a thought based on Aristotelian principles centered on Parmenidean identity, we find a perspective that aims to think about how boundaries actually emerge... This is the idea of an enthroned anarchy, and when the land is not defined within certain boundaries, the hierarchy is reversed (Deleuze, 1993, p. 60).

What does all this mean? First, to posit the individuating principles as the real problem of metaphysics is equivalent to approach it as a transcendental principle; transcendental refers to a specific individual, expresses a movement towards the conditions of his emergence. Secondly, individuation expresses the conditions for individuals' individuation and continuation in their existence. It is transcendental in the Deleuzian sense because it is plastic, it refers to the conditions directly related to the individual. Third, it does not refer to a period before experience, as in Kant's thought, but it refers to conditions contemporary with individuation itself. Finally, it is anarchic and nomadic because it cannot come into existence according to certain essences, but occurs within experience and remains in close relationship with the real conditions. This strange universe emerges as the plane of all individualizations and their collapse and extinction.

The Deleuzian strategy proceeds from downwards, from the the real conditions of individuation. Contrary, Aristotle's world is the happy moment (le moment heureux) of knowledge and judgement, in which univocity of beings is well defined. But there is also another logos in Aristotle. Why? Because the genus-species relation is only the middle of a schema in which knowledge has posited as the knowledge of generality. In short, Aristotle's genus-species distinction emerges thanks to other divisions. What do we encounter when we move downwards or upwards? When we move to this level, it begins to seem as if there were two types of logos in nature; Moreover, their natures are different from each other. On the one hand, there is the logos of the species, within which logos moves on by dividing the genus into species. But, the logos of the genders has a completely different feature. There is equivocity or diversity of the most general concepts and they can be brought together in an analogical way (Deleuze, 1993, p. 49). This dispersal of Being into different meanings requires a logic of analogy, a process of proportion. This logic of measure and proportion has the form of judgment. Hierarchical but unified, depending on distance or proximity, it has to provide a certain system of justice (Deleuze, 1993, p. 50). This could be human justice that works according to common sense. The unity that operates through genus-species, finally operates within certain standards and takes into account certain similarities when it comes to the difference between genders. But from where comes the necessary existence of analogy or what does the function of analogy? “Analogy is essentially the essence of judgment, but the analogy of judgment is analogous to the identity of the concept” (Deleuze 1993, 50). Here we find a system that operates according to requirements of representation in a such way that what is higher depends on what is lower! This is essentially based on a logic of essences, on an ontology. In a sense, the starting point of everything is the borders which have to be drawn clearly through the genus-species relationship. The extreme point reached is analogy, and this analogy justifies itself through the identity of the concept and functions as an analogue to it. Once the entire system is established from a correct middle point, from the genus-species relationship, the upward and the downward must be seen according to knowledge. In short, the univocity of species within a genus corresponds to an equivocity between genera (Deleuze, 1993, p. 51). That's to say, the happy moment seems to be overshadowed by the analogy; First of all, the difference becomes dependent

on the identity of the concept in the reflexive structure of the concept. And outside of this system, the judgement system is based on a generical analogy, which is mere “semblance” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 52).

The organic representation itself, which thinks from the border itself and always thinks of the border as a closure, suffers the wrath of the border. No matter what, organic representational thought who begins to think within the limits, could not provide a secure land for knowledge; there is the being of infinity as a threat comes from upward and downward. The darkness is more powerful than lightness of representation. Is there any solution to this danger?

2. INFINITE REPRESENTATION

Deleuze says that Hegel grounds another type of representation, the infinite representation (Deleuze 1993, 62). This discussion is made through Hegel and Leibniz. Instead of the idea of form based on certain limits, these two philosophers establish a dynamic representational system in which the limit is redefined, starting from the finite itself. In Hegel and Leibniz, we see two different forms of transcending organic and finite representation. Accordingly, the limit changes meaning. The limit is no longer an exclusionary barrier that completely separates the thing from the others, but it is the place where existence and its destruction occur; “It is the very notion of limit which completely changes its meaning: it no longer designates the limits of the finite representation, but on the contrary the matrix where the finite determination never ceases to disappear and to be born, to envelop itself and to unfold itself in the organic representation” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 62).

The limit is to go beyond for Hegel. Thus, the movement of going beyond is emphasized very clearly in Hegel. Going beyond limit is precisely the birth of the infinite. According to Hegel, the basic essence of being consists of its self-negation. Through the self-negation finite becomes only this transition to infinite (Hegel 2010, 109-110). The nature of finite consists of negation that negates its own finite being. In this sense, the finite is a moment in the construction of infinite. On the other hand, for Leibniz, the limit is convergence, determined by differential connections (Deleuze, 1993, p. 67). The limit becomes integrative rather than exclusionary. Here too, we pass from the finite to the infinite because the finite points beyond itself.

How to posit and present the finitude of the finite? The change in the meaning of the limit brings about thinking of finite beings with their own extinction. In this case, for infinite representation, every finite determination comes into existence in order to disappear, and the necessity of its destruction is always given. For Hegel, for example, the finite refers from the beginning to the end. To be finite is to be at the end, to be sent to the limit. Infinite representation is an attempt to ground the existence of those who come into existence in order to disappear, or it is the representation of their existence as disappearing beings. This representation necessarily goes to a ground (zum grunde gehen) and is thought from a ground. The finite is born and disappears in the infinite. In an organic structure the form must limit the finite, separate it and thus make it representable, whereas here the limited thing is sent to the ground. It is connected to a ground from which it comes to appearance for a limited time.

This exercise of representation, also shows that we are outside a typical system of the judgement. Now we move on to propositional logic. In Hegel, this is the synthetic power of contradiction. Leibniz, on the other hand, develops a different idea that will be an inspiration for Deleuze. In this kind of thinking, we move from the generality itself to the event. In both cases, there is a productive process; the finites are attached to a ground according to the requirements of representation. Reference is made to the ground, as sufficient reason or as contradiction.

2.1. LEIBNIZ, THE LOGIC OF EVENT

If every true predicate is to be contained in the subject, and since they are true, they will be analytic and the identity will not be broken, the concept will necessarily change its form. It is necessary to talk about the concept of Caesar, in which everything that will happen to him, as well as other things connected to him must be included; “It will be enough to make you realize with horror that from that moment on, you have to cram into the notion of the subject not only what you rightly attribute to it, but the whole world” (Deleuze, 2007, p. 31). In short, the concept, through this transformation must also include the whole World inside of it, because, at this stage the concept has relation to other individual concepts; Caesar has a relation to Rubicon and also has a relation to civil war, which defines the specific character of Caesar. Caesar’s own concept has also a relation to past and future; for example, Caesar’s own concept must be related to a past where Adam is a sinner.

Contrary to the concept of organic representation, the concept now generally relates not to unity but to singularity. The concept is a specific name, not a generality anymore. We have gone far beyond Aristotle’s horizon (Deleuze, 2007, p. 33). Considered in this way, when we place the world in the singular, the exact cause must also be placed as a sufficient reason. “The principle of sufficient reason can be expressed as follows: everything that will happen to a subject, whether spatial and temporal determinations, whether relations or events, everything that will happen

to a subject, that is, everything that can be said to be true about him, must be included” (Deleuze, 2007, p. 28). It must be shown and proven that the concept includes every event. The concept is no longer a logical thing, a generality, it is metaphysical and defined by events (Deleuze, 1988, p. 56). The new definition of concept as singularity opens up another horizon. The essential is the production of the inessential.

In this way, it becomes clear why Leibniz switched to differential calculus. For Deleuze, these calculations also serve an important function in the presentation of the virtual idea. What is intended by differential calculus? It is a way of determination. Most fundamentally, the aim is to demonstrate that it is theoretically possible to start from the indeterminate to the determined through the multiple elements (events). In these calculations, the process of reciprocal determination comes into play, so there is no independent variable; it is essential that the variable coefficients are interconnected (Deleuze, 1993, p. 66). dx is indeterminate with respect to x , dy with respect to y , but a value emerges in their connections. The dx/dy relationship reveals a value, even though they are nothing in their distinction. In this reciprocal connection, we obtain a complete determination, but it is not yet the whole (entier), it does not have an actual existence. In short, a differential relation gives the thing itself in its completeness without being actual, from which the other part is already derived. The best of all possible worlds, however, is based only on the most complete continuity of these determinable elements, comes into existence. In this way the other part is completed; “If the real world is the best of all possible worlds, it is so insofar as it offers maximum continuity in maximum situation, maximum connection, and maximum salient point” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 68). It is a system where these elements (principle of indistinguishability) establish an endless relationship with each other (principle of continuity), aiming to ensure the continuity of their inclusion in each event and situation. The whole world must be contained in the singular concept, but only through differential connection. In this case, the event or the non-essential is not unimportant because essences are only made of them, produced by them (Deleuze, 1993, p. 67). Essence is made of non-essentials. This clearly implies that essence can be linked to the contingent, to the event. This is what Deleuze is trying to do.

Let's consider this issue through *The Fold*. Every consciousness is a threshold, but threshold is also the smallest state of consciousness, which consists of infinitesimal parts. A conscious perception occurs with these infinitesimal parts entering into a differential relationship. What needs to be taken into consideration here is the fact that these small ones, the infinitely small ones, are never parts, but elements and are even genetical elements (éléments génétiques) (Deleuze, 1988, p. 117-118). According to Deleuze, small perceptions are “differentials of consciousness” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 118). But here at first glance, it may be felt that an unconscious process has come to the fore, because the soul's own automatism (Maimon) will come to the fore, and its ability to synthesize genetic elements will also be the origin of the Kantian active consciousness. Precisely, because Leibniz returns from the cosmological to the microscopic and from the microscopic to it again (Deleuze, 1988, p. 116). He provides a tool for the destruction of the grand representations of the universe; With him, these grand representations have no longer a solid ground, and their legitimacy becomes questionable. Therefore, in Deleuze, Ideas appear as unconscious differentials of the cogniton. There is a completely different, productive world below the threshold of consciousness. In short, the possibility of beginning with infinitesimals paves the way for the destruction of the Self. The power to synthesize is taken from the Self. It is no longer a power, but can only be an impact. Still, even though Leibniz is a good alternative within infinite representation, he remains within representation. For Deleuze, what is decisive about Leibniz is his oscillation between possibility and virtuality. These are the reasons why Leibniz, although he offers many tools, still remains within representation; “Whenever he speaks of ideas, he presents them as virtual multiplicities made of differential connections and singular points (...). But here, the place where ideas actualize themselves is grasped rather as a possible, a realized possibility” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 275). In Leibniz, as soon as the virtual is discovered, it is dethroned. It will be necessary to put forward a virtual space against the category of possibility of representation.

Thinking from the possible also means thinking in terms of convergence; If the world is thought as being surrounded by individuals in converging singularities, acting on the possible tries to base the continuity of the past and future through the living present. What is new, or what is extremely out of joint of time is unthinkable, because there must be a continuity extended to the end. Let us first summarize the sixteenth series in the Logic of Sense and try to reveal the basic problem here. In this series, the question of how the world-individual-interindividuality and the Ego are realized (effectuer) is asked through the problem of realization. Essentially, the Leibnizian perspective is at work. With this, two transcendentals are achieved. The first is an immanent one, where the World emerges by encompassing converging singularities. In the other, an objective one, a field of transcendental where the Ego is against the world, is produced. The ego transcends the monad and its affiliations. Precisely, in the Ego, not only converging singularities but also divergent singularities are thought. The ego thinks through divergent series cannot fully coexist; The possibility of transcending the converging singularities embedded in the monad becomes visible. In this whole process, this Ego is essentially an alternative to Husserl's. It is not the first, as it is in Husserl, it has already been established. Deleuze defines the whole issue in general terms in this way. But what is the real question here? The problem is to set the conditions for the free play of divergence. Deleuze says that

now we are beyond the world of individuations established by fixed singularities and converging series (Deleuze, 1969, p. 139). So, what does this kind of being-beyond actually mean?

Right at the beginning of the series, the question is asked: Is there any possibility for a new series? Is it possible to create a new World (Deleuze, 1969, p. 134)? If this power is not in question, wouldn't the past and future exist only in a simple continuity (Deleuze, 1969, p. 134)? This continuity is based only on the possible and the possible is only the reconsideration of the past. Again, there is a limit that cannot be crossed. But, those that are not possible together, to which divergent series are connected, must actually belong to the same world (Tissandier, 2018, p. 62-63). As a result, representation separates those who should belong to the same world, and by distributing the production of the game of difference to different worlds the new is excluded from the actual World. In short, in Leibniz the idea is completely borned by representation, which is the rule of extreme continuity of co-possibles. But the Deleuzian aim is free idea for their own determination in a space fully virtual. The new depends on the determination of ideas in a reciprocal manner.

The goal is to transition from finite representation to infinite representation and to reach a non-representative thought beyond this infinite representation. At this point, Leibniz provides more tools than Hegel. Hegel, on the other hand, is presented as the alternative that should be avoided. Generally speaking, the Hegel-Deleuze relationship should therefore be considered in the context of the Leibniz problem. Deleuze says; "A Leibnizian Transcendental philosophy based on the event rather than the phenomenon replaces the Kantian conditioning by the double process of actualization and Transcendental realization" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 163). In short, Hegel, as the main enemy of Deleuze, represent only the false movement inside the post-kantian philosophy.

However, infinite representation poses a major problem. In the case of Leibniz, this presupposes a thought that refers to a selective ground. It is centered on co-possibility, and those who are not co-possible are simply excluded. This brings with it the mediation of difference. The basic Deleuzian principle is to go directly to the difference itself. However, the difference is mediated here too. In accordance with the principle of continuity, maximum continuity is essential, which brings into play a selection process from the very beginning (Deleuze, 1993, p. 69). Deleuze sees in the idea exactly this inherent determination, the conditions for the indeterminate to be determinate. The ground has collapsed here so that there is no certain unity. In this way it is possible for the indeterminate to be determinate. The Idea is therefore multiplicity, its inherent determination, so it does not require ground like the notion of co-possibility. We are not yet at this point in infinite representation. It is a ground-centered thought; Convergence dominates in one, contradiction dominates in the other. Therefore infinite representation, like finite representation, has a false concept of difference; This time the difference is inscribed in the identity of the concept, and the identity is no longer a genus but a principle (Deleuze, 1993, p. 71). A genus is no longer divided into species, a substance is no longer formed, but in Hegel and Leibniz the finite extends towards infinity and becomes a disappearing being in the whole infinite which is identity *par excellence*.

2.2. HEGEL AND THE NATURE OF INFINITE

The feature that truly distinguishes Hegel from other philosophers is the idea that infinity is here between us. But this requires considering the finite from another perspective. The finite has also its own truth, so that the finite appears as carrying its own limit within itself, and the limit is not external and given to it (Hegel, 1996, p. 111). The finite experiences contradiction precisely because of this limit; its own negation is inherent to it. The finite here is Hegel's category of Dasein and is discussed in its relationship with Something and Other. Until Hegel came here, he acted through the categories of being, nothingness and becoming, through the inherent movement of being. Becoming ends with determinate being, and determinate being is in this sense the unity of being and nothingness; It carries its own absence within itself, so that this absence has become a determinate absence for the determinate being. The limit is precisely the immanence of this alterity. This immanence of the beyond in the limit leads Hegel to re-evaluate the infinite and to reveal the real infinity. This means that there is a productive process, which creates the infinite inside of the finite, as such manner that to goes beyond itself becomes the categorical imperative.

The aim, then, is the unity of "ought" and being as such, since there is always a transcendence in the expression of imperative. So, according to Hegel, what kind of contradiction does "imperative" contain, and what makes it finite? Once this is answered, we have a sketch of the nature of the infinite. On the one hand, it is said, "You can because you ought" (Hegel, 2010, p. 105). This, of course, includes the possibility of overcoming, of removing the obstacle. On the other hand, this statement is equally true; "But, conversely, "you cannot, even though you ought" is just as correct" (Hegel, 2010, p. 105). On the one hand, it is possible to overcome it, but on the other hand, it is imposed as impossible. In this case, the reconstruction of the infinite becomes an important issue for Hegel. Every transcendence brings with it the necessity of remaining in the finite. Then, the aim will be to reach a point where the infinite is essentially immanent, and to leave behind this contradiction hidden in the word "ought". Of course, if there is a limit or an obstacle, the beyond is necessarily accessible.

But in Kantian “ought”, for example the main mistake is to take ought something beyond actuality. As a consequence, in this point of view it is not possible to reach to infinity in its exact meaning. According to Hegel the real meaning of infinity is the concept as self-determination. On the other hand, “The ought, for its part, is the transcending of restriction, but a transcending which is itself only finite (Hegel, 2010, p. 107). Therefore, passing the given finite is not a sufficient transition; it is necessary to reach the infinite itself, but it is also necessary to achieve this by revealing the immanent existence of the infinite. We already have two definitions of infinity; One always exceeds the finite with the “ought”, but still remains in the finite. The other grasps that the infinite is immanent and actual. For Hegel, then, the infinity turns from a practical and moral problem into a theoretical problem. In Guzman's words, the contradiction that knowing solves is actually a harmony in disharmony (Guzman, 2015, p. 59). Therefore, the contradictory progress of the concept, which can always realize itself, paves the way for the infinite to become immanent and actual.

In the beginning, being is indeterminate and indistinguishable from nothingness. Being has turned into determinate being, it has a determinate quality and has become one with its quality. Determinacy means having a limit. But here we come face to face with a new form of the limit, the limit as negation, where the origin of the infinite is now sought, and the infinite finds its determination in this limit. Negation is what prevents determinate being from being an indifferent organic whole or an organized being; It could become nothing but an entity within its own borders, indifferent to the outside. But due to negation, it is outside of itself; being completely far from being sufficient for himself means the same thing as being always in a state of being outside himself. This negativity, containing his own absence, cannot be taken away from it. It is a characteristic of the individual and makes it an entity that has a negative relationship with itself, preventing it from being a self-sufficient entity (Türken, 2016, p. 24). This is how the particular being is at same time one thing and another. The fact that it is divided into two and considered in relation to another means that it is not a self-sufficient organic whole. This negative relationship with himself also causes him to go towards infinity. An important lesson comes from all this; all determinacy arises through negation.

The finite cannot remain indifferent and as a thing in itself. In this case, the target is the problem of grounding the infinite, but the infinite should not be seen simply as beyond the finite. To understand the finite means to uncover the infinite. So, there are two requirements; The idea that the finite should be given its due and the infinite should not be transcendent and beyond. These two are the basic principles behind the concept of Hegelian thought as self-determination. As can be seen from here, Hegel makes a new definition of the infinite. This point is important because after Kant, the Hegelian project was founded on rethinking the finite together with the infinite, bringing the infinite here and thinking the finite together with the infinite. Precisely because idealism must also prove that the finite is ideal too.

The relationship of the finite with its own limit and the contradictory existence it has due to this relationship exactly opens the way to the infinite. In a way, this reminds us of what Deleuze calls infinite representation; “When representation finds the infinite in itself, it appears as infinite representation and is no longer organic: He discovers the turmoil, anxiety and passion within himself beneath the serene appearance or organized boundary. He finds the monster again” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 61). What is found again here is actually the difference that the idea of finite representation escapes; Finite representation escapes from difference and confines existence within borders, does not want to see the monster, the difference. Infinite representation is this awareness of the monster but the desire to bring it back under surveillance. According to these expressions of Deleuze, infinite representation is an idea of representation that is not fooled by the serene appearance of finite representation. The transition to the infinite is precisely linked to the fact that the limit itself becomes immanent to the finite, not simply distributed and given. According to Deleuze, a given and distributed limit is exactly what the Aristotelian system offers when it comes to genus-species relationship. The limit is a given and well defined. However, in Hegel, the immanent nature of the limit, in other words the limit as the real definition of the whole thing, actually brings it into relationship with the being of the other, or more precisely, with its own absence. The finite experiences this contradiction. The noise of difference enters the thing precisely because of its structure. Noise, a constant state of inquietude... The discovery of difference or the monster, takes the finite into the infinite and the harmonious and structured world of ancient Greece disappears (Deleuze, 1993, p. 61). Something that has become organized and has its own integrity and shape now appears to carry its own boundaries and alterity within itself. It is itself the whole as being the moment of whole. This essentially opens up the possibility of going to infinity.

Arriving here, moving from the finite to the infinite in the Deleuzian sense, is a feature that defines Hegel. The infinite must not be beyond and transcendent, on the contrary must come down to earth, but also must not simply be an infinity in which every finite is negated. For Hegel, the infinite is self-determination; “But this progress to infinity is not truly infinite; The real infinite, on the contrary, consists in being in itself in its other, or, expressed as a process, in coming to itself in its other” (Hegel, 1996, p. 112). This point is important because the infinite is not the infinite of transition, where determinations are constantly in disappearance in their others. It must be considered in the form of a selfhood, and, like the concept, it must be considered in relation to this determination.

That's to say, the infinite in the form of universal must also contain the finite which appears as singular. The singular as finite is being-there of the universal as infinite. This de-sublimation of the infinite is the distinguishing feature of the Hegelian infinite. At the end, the infinite is here with us.

Hegel essentially tries to see the finite and the infinite in unity. But what kind of unity should this be? Is it a going beyond, or simply a connection with an "and"? Do we need to choose exactly one of these options? Hegel chooses another path. Accordingly, the problem should be considered in terms of concept. The transition of the finite to the infinite must constitute the external reality of the concept. Accordingly, transition is the unity of the finite with the infinite, the external dimension of the concept. It is in and thanks to this external relationship, this external unity of the finite and the infinite, that the concept realizes itself and gains determination (Hegel, 2014, p. 107-108). With such a move, there is no need to reach either a transcendent infinity or a bad infinity. In the concept or self-consciousness we will see a glimmer of the infinite, the true infinite.

The whole process can be summarized as follows; The finite negates itself and becomes the infinite, and this negation is also negated, so that a movement closed within itself emerges, the finite finds itself restored in this double negation of itself. In the same way, the infinite emerges as the exceeding of a limit and re-asserts itself and advances in another limit, appearing as the exceeding of the finite and as its re-assertion. Double negation and unity prevail on both sides;

According to this concept, the unity of the finite and the infinite is not an external bringing together of them, nor an incongruous combination that goes against their nature, one in which inherently separate and opposed terms that exist independently and are consequently incompatible, would be knotted together. Rather, each is itself this unity, and this only as a sublating of itself in which neither would have an advantage over the other in in-itselfness and affirmative existence (Hegel, 2010, p. 116).

The real infinite emerges as the intertwining of these two sides. In this sense, the real infinite must be able to carry within itself the movement of making its opposite its moment. Karin de Boer's comment seems revealing in this sense. In fact, the symmetrical structure in bad infinity, formed by the emergence of the finite and the infinite as moments of each other, should be replaced by an asymmetrical structure. An example of this is self-consciousness; Self-consciousness both distinguishes itself from and relates to empirical consciousness. In this way, it realizes itself infinitely and exists in the world of appearance along with its empirical consciousness. As Karin de Boer puts it more clearly, this is actually a subjugation. This intertwining of the finite and the infinite submits to the infinite (Boer, 2010, p. 91). And the transition to thinking the finite and the infinite in a unity emerges in an asymmetrical relationship. The infinite is the one who prevails in this relationship. Actualization is the own movement of the infinite. Apart from this, in line with Boer's interpretation, Hegel tries to reveal the circular existence of the true infinite against the straight line metaphor in the bad infinity. In the former, there is a return while in the latter, there is only an alternance without an aim;

The image of the progression in infinity is the straight line; the infinite is only at the two limits of this line, and always only is where the latter (which is existence) is not but transcends itself, in its non-existence, that is, in the indeterminate. As true infinite, bent back upon itself, its image becomes the circle, the line that has reached itself, closed and wholly present, without beginning and end (Hegel, 2010, p. 119).

As a consequence, the true infinite is reality itself; "It is not the finite which is the real, but rather the infinite. Thus reality is further determined as essence, concept, idea, and so forth" (Hegel, 2010, p. 119). When the Essence is considered, the finite is the appearance of the essence, it is related to it, and the real existence of the finite is its essence (ground), or again when the Concept is considered, the finite or the singular is the very movement of the concept itself in its *own* appearance.

The real problem in Hegel, when it comes to infinite is not an issue of the ground and grounded; in the essence section the appearance has no reality in-itself. But in the Concept the singular is itself the universal, not only an appearance. Deleuze has right when he conceptualize Hegelian philosophy as infinite representation. But his interpretation fails when he accentuates the third figure of reflection, that's to say ground, as the real location of infinite;

The Logic, which in truth is the concept, is the ground for the real. Or rather, since ground is an abstract determination of essence, which reveals itself to be in truth the concept, we should say that the logical is only the ground for the real in that this ground is in itself the concept. But precisely, this temptation to explain the concrete (rational) category of the concept by the abstract category (stemming from the understanding) of ground [. . .] perhaps expresses the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of grasping as concept the relation of the logical and the real, of thought and being. (Longuenesse, 2007, p. 104-105).

The concept is the main figure in Hegel's *Science of Logic*. The first two parts is only the deduction of the concept. But the concept as the true infinite is the real ground of the whole. And the singular, the outward being of the universal is itself the whole concept. In this way, the singular is the real hypokeimenon of the infinite.

3. CONCLUSION: WHY DELEUZE IS ANTI-HEGELIAN?

Deleuze is a post-Kantian philosopher. In this sense that the idea he tries to maintain is about the production of the knowledge or the new within the boundaries of experience itself. He also associates himself with pre-Kantian philosophy. The examples of this associations are the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz. But, in *Difference and Repetition*, Leibniz's predominance could be clearly seen. In his work, the unity of Kant and Leibniz could be felt. This is particularly clear from his reference to Maimon and his use of calculations, by naming experience itself as real experience. The tradition to which he essentially returns individuates the concept, as in Leibniz, for example, or the experience, as in Kant.

But Hegelian philosophy criticizes Kantian philosophy as ahistorical and therefore as outside the Spirit. Because the experience is completely spiritual. Contrary to Deleuze, the real experience is individual and unconscious; there is a creation inside the subject. The real experience demands an openness to the creation which is unpredictable. In short, the Spirit Hegelian is a collectivity, a self-determination which submits all the singularities. The opposition between the *Grande* (Hegel) and the *Petite* (Leibniz) is an opposition between spiritual and individual. At the end, Deleuze is an anti-Hegelian because he emphasises the experience in its individual and unconscious form. The root of this philosophy unsurprisingly is Leibniz who discovers the unconscious genesis of perception. Also there is Maimon, the best reader of Kant who sees a creation beneath the understanding which escapes the Transcendental I. In short, in Deleuze the problem is the genesis of the new and therefore the real conditions of experience.

But Hegelian philosophy accentuates the history and historical experience. The real experience depends on historical conditions, thus on spiritual reality. For example, *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is a book which associates Kantian reason to Spirit, because, according to Hegel, reason is itself historical. Ultimately, Deleuze is anti-Hegelian, because knowledge or artistic production is not spiritual but involves an individual and unconscious process. Creation appears in its own reserved zone, outside the spiritual sphere.

In Hegel the Universal as concept individualize itself while in Leibniz the whole World is inside of monad. The concept Hegelian is there as something primordial by preventing the singular. On the contrary, monad has an autonomy. But this autonomy becomes more explicit only with the idea of a new theory of experience; this is why the Kantian experience was rethought in conjunction with Leibnizian thought.

In short, creation of new requires autonomy. But in Hegelian philosophy the production of knowledge and the emergence of newness from this production is something thoroughly spiritual. And the contradiction, as the *Grande* in opposition to *Petite* (Leibniz), is the main reason of movement and transformation because in Hegel the singular is the incarnation of the Universal and the Universal moves itself through singularities. The real origin of contradiction is this conceptual form. In Leibniz, the singular monad has the World inside of itself. It is already an island which comprehends the totality, not by being an incarnation but being itself the whole from a point of view. In Leibniz the individual has its own reality detachable from the *Grande* as something *Petite*. At the end, Deleuzian point of view in difference and repetition is that of the monad. According to Deleuze the geography comes first in relation to history, because here geography means monad, whereas history means spirit. And The Monad is this place where the new emerges unconsciously inside of it. It is the factory inside of which the synthesis of the multiplicity occurs.

To put it simply, monad in its self realization is the geography where the production occurs. But the truth of spirit is its historical being and the development of the *history* relies on negation and opposition, then on contradiction. Here one must bear on mind the category of reflection in the science of logic; contradiction is the alterity that is on the ground of the identity, one of the categories of reflection. Hegel's thought on contradiction reflects the necessary presence of the conflict in the heart of beings, especially when it comes to conscious beings. But the distinctive feature of monad in relation to other monads paves the way for an original point of view; through the exclusion of *pre-established harmony* from *monadology* it becomes possible to reside beyond theology. The new monad, the geography purified from theological effects, is itself the unique potential for grounding reality in its objectified presence. In short, Deleuze, as a successor of Leibniz, puts forward another version of *monadology*, thanks to which there is always a continuous creation of the World.

But for the solution of this whole issue, it would be more useful to consider that both Deleuze and Hegel are Kantians. For example, Deleuze is a Kantian who denies the identical subject, in a such a way that, the creation comes in view after the destruction of the identical subject. This means that the Kantian revolution must be brought to its conclusion; the I must not only be divided by the line of time, by the affection of the empirical World, but

must also be divided in its whole being for the sake of creation. In this movement, the pieces of the I becomes like colours through which the reality organizes itself in a new landscape. For Deleuze, as for Kant, the real philosophical problem is the emergence of objectivity. Hegelian philosophy is a diverse approach to this objectivation problem; the whole *Logic* is the path that conducts us towards the process of objectivation. The concept and its possibility of taking place in the objectivation process (because in its totality, objectivity is plastic being that could be submitted to a purpose) and the idea as the result of a synthesis of these two moments is the grounding of an objectivity; therefore, the objectivity is itself the process of being conceptual of the reality as a whole plastic. As a result, the Spirit as a conceptual form is the reason behind the objectivation and the objectivity. There is no objectivity intact and pure but there is always a spiritual objectivity. Hence, the Idea is the synthesis of concept and objectivity and the Spirit is the reason and vitality behind the objectivity's being objective.

The point of view behind of this reasoning is the Kantian Transcendental I; the I is itself the identity in difference and also the universal with its incarnation in the singularity. The complete being of I, its empirical and transcendental shapes is the main racine of the Hegelian *Concept*; in opposition to Deleuzian insight, Hegel accentuates the I in the formation of the objectivity, whereas Deleuze needs a total destruction of the *ego cogito*...

But Kant presupposes a new viewing of things in a such a way that the real problem of philosophy could not remain the same. The copernician turn has a connection to this; the metaphysical approach, which accepts an objectivity in its purified form, that's to say an objectivity without subjectivity poses some problems. In order to leave these problems behind, the presence of the subject had to be brought to the fore. The subject had to be the sole legitimate ground of the knowledge, because there were no legitimate metaphysical truth in itself, and the subject had to reply the sceptical attack. In short, the Kantian problem was the true point of departure of the problem of the objectivation. For Kant, this expresses the necessity of establishing legitimacy through the subject in a such manner that the only ground for a such legitimacy could be found in the experience. The Kantian problem is also a constitution of the experience for *grounding* objectivity. But for Deleuze and Hegel, there is no sole ground for a such constitution. There is only experience in itself... According to Hegel the only experience is spiritual and conceptual in its conflictual form in a such way that the experience is the constitution of objectivity incessantly in movement. But this time the experience is itself the destruction of the subject. Being a subject precisely means turning away from experience, avoiding producing oneself as a work of art. On the contrary, in its true meaning experience is being ready to encounter what is outside of the subjective frame. The subject always acts with an assurance that is either assumed (Descartes) or demanded (Kant), whether through a Cartesian method, through the medium of Kantian consciousness, or through the bending of objectivity through the mediation of the concept (Hegel). Here, Heidegger's expression of being thrown into the world gains a meaning. However, for Deleuze, we have been literally thrown into the sea (Voss, 2013, p. 62). The absence of any method or assurance forces us to learn necessarily and to enter into relationship with differential ideas.

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ÇALIŞMANIN ETİK İZİNİ

Yapılan bu çalışmada “Yükseköğretim Kurumları Bilimsel Araştırma ve Yayın Etiği Yönergesi” kapsamında uyulması belirtilen tüm kurallara uyulmuştur. Yönergenin ikinci bölümü olan “Bilimsel Araştırma ve Yayın Etiğine Aykırı Eylemler” başlığı altında belirtilen eylemlerden hiçbiri gerçekleştirilmemiştir.

ARAŞTIRMACILARIN KATKI ORANI

1.yazarın araştırmaya katkı oranı %100'dür. Yazar 1: Araştırmada literatür taraması, araştırma ve analizlerin tamamı.

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