Öz
Colin McGinn claims that there is a naturalistic solution of the mind-body problem, but it is not constructive. That is, according to him, there is a natural and simple explanation of consciousness-brain interaction; however, because of our limited cognitive capacity we can never specify the link between the mind and the brain. Scientific explanation of the problem cannot be possible, so solution of the consciousness problem will remain an epistemic mystery for human beings. McGinn’s theory which is the basis of his mysterianism, is called Transcendental Naturalism (TN), and he formulates this theory with three main arguments. The main purpose of this work is to reveal that McGinn's arguments are baseless and that his mysterianism is pseudo-mysterianism. To achieve this purpose, I will discuss TN by respectively analyzing his three main arguments and their problematic aspects. Firstly, I will draw attention to McGinn’s first argument – I will call it “(i) the argument for naturalism.” Secondly, I will draw attention to the second argument which I will call “(ii) the argument for closure,” and I will show that McGinn’s cognitive closure idea on which epistemic mystery of consciousness is mainly based is also problematic. After briefly explaining his last argument which I will call “(iii) the argument for dissolution,” at the end of this work, I will have manifested that (i)-(iii) are not a satisfactory triad to leave the problem of consciousness to dark side, and McGinn’s mysterianism is pseudo-mysterianism.
Anahtar Kelimeler
mind-body problem Colin McGinn mysterianism cognitive closure pseudo-mysterianism
Kaynakça
- Brueckner, A. and Beroukhim, E. A. (2003). “McGinn on Consciousness and the Mind Body Problem.” In Q. Smith, A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chomsky, N. (1976). “Problems and Mysteries in the Study of Human Language.” In Asa Kasher (ed.), Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 43: 281-357.
- Chomsky, N. (1998). On Language. London, New York: The New Press.
- Chomsky, N. (2013). “What Can We Understand?” The Journal of Philosophy, 110: 663-684.
- Demircioglu, E. (2016). “Against McGinn’s Mysterianism.” Cilicia Journal of Philosophy, 1: 1-10.
- Dennett, D. (1991). Review of McGinn’s The Problem of Consciousness. The Times Literary Supplement.
- Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. London: Penguin Books.
- Flanagan, O. J. (1993). Consciousness Reconsidered. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Hanson, P. (1993). “McGinn’s Cognitive Closure.” Dialogue, 32(3): 579-585.
- Işıkgil, S. (2017). “An Analysis on McGinn’s Mysterianism: Reply to Erhan Demircioglu.” Cilicia Journal of Philosophy, 1: 11-18.
- Kriegel, U. (2003). “The New Mysterianism and The Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica, 18: 177-191.
- Kriegel, U. (2009). “Mysterianism.” In T. Bayne, A. Cleermans, & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McGinn, C. (1989). “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind, 98(391): 349-366.
- McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGinn, C. (1993). Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGinn, C. (1994). “The Problem of Philosophy.” Philosophical Studies, 76(2-3): 133-156.
- McGinn, C. (1995). “Consciousness and Space.” In T. Metzinger (ed.), Consciouss Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
- McGinn, C. (1996). The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press.
- McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books.
- McGinn, C. (2003). “What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?” Philosophical Issues, 13: 148-162.
- McGinn, C. (2004). Consciousness and its objects. New York: Oxford University Press
- Perez, D. I. (2005). “Mysteries and Scandals. Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy.” Critica, 37(110): 35-52.
- Whiteley, C. H. (1990). “McGinn on the Mind-Body Problem.” Mind, 99: 289.
Öz
McGinn, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” başlıklı makalesinde zihin-beden probleminin doğalcı bir çözümü olduğunu ancak bunun yapıcı olmadığını iddia etmektedir. Ona göre bilinç-beyin etkileşiminin doğal ve basit bir açıklaması vardır; ancak sınırlı bilişsel kapasitemiz nedeniyle zihin ile beyin arasındaki bağlantıyı asla belirleyemeyiz. Bu durumda problemin bilimsel bir açıklaması mümkün olamayacağı için bilinç probleminin yapıcı çözümü insanlık için epistemik bir gizem olarak kalacaktır. McGinn’in gizemciliğine temel teşkil eden teorisi Transandantal Doğalcılık (TD) olarak adlandırılır ve McGinn bu teoriyi üç ana argüman ile formüle eder. Bu çalışmanın asıl amacı McGinn’in argümanlarının temelsiz olduğunu ve gizemciliğinin de sözde-gizemcilik olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda bu çalışmada sırasıyla bu üç ana argümanı ve her birinin sorunlu yönlerini inceleyerek TD'yi tartışacağım. Öncelikle McGinn'in ilk argümanına dikkat çekeceğim—bunu “(i) doğalcılık argümanı” olarak adlandıracağım. Sonrasında, “(ii) kapalılık argümanı” olarak adlandırdığım ikinci argümana dikkat çekeceğim ve bilincin epistemik gizeminin esas olarak dayandırıldığı bilişsel kapalılık fikrinin sorunlu olduğunu göstereceğim. “(iii) Çözümleme argümanı” olarak adlandırdığım son argümanını kısaca açıkladıktan sonra, bu çalışmanın sonunda (i)-(iii) üçlüsünün bilinç problemini karanlıkta bırakmak için tatmin edici olmadığını ve McGinn'in gizemciliğinin sözde-gizemcilik olduğunu ortaya koymuş olacağım.
Anahtar Kelimeler
zihin-beden problemi Colin McGinn gizemcilik bilişsel kapalılık sözde-gizemcilik
Kaynakça
- Brueckner, A. and Beroukhim, E. A. (2003). “McGinn on Consciousness and the Mind Body Problem.” In Q. Smith, A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chomsky, N. (1976). “Problems and Mysteries in the Study of Human Language.” In Asa Kasher (ed.), Language in Focus: Foundations, Methods and Systems. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 43: 281-357.
- Chomsky, N. (1998). On Language. London, New York: The New Press.
- Chomsky, N. (2013). “What Can We Understand?” The Journal of Philosophy, 110: 663-684.
- Demircioglu, E. (2016). “Against McGinn’s Mysterianism.” Cilicia Journal of Philosophy, 1: 1-10.
- Dennett, D. (1991). Review of McGinn’s The Problem of Consciousness. The Times Literary Supplement.
- Dennett, D. (1995). Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. London: Penguin Books.
- Flanagan, O. J. (1993). Consciousness Reconsidered. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Hanson, P. (1993). “McGinn’s Cognitive Closure.” Dialogue, 32(3): 579-585.
- Işıkgil, S. (2017). “An Analysis on McGinn’s Mysterianism: Reply to Erhan Demircioglu.” Cilicia Journal of Philosophy, 1: 11-18.
- Kriegel, U. (2003). “The New Mysterianism and The Thesis of Cognitive Closure.” Acta Analytica, 18: 177-191.
- Kriegel, U. (2009). “Mysterianism.” In T. Bayne, A. Cleermans, & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McGinn, C. (1989). “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” Mind, 98(391): 349-366.
- McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness: Essays toward a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGinn, C. (1993). Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. Oxford: Blackwell.
- McGinn, C. (1994). “The Problem of Philosophy.” Philosophical Studies, 76(2-3): 133-156.
- McGinn, C. (1995). “Consciousness and Space.” In T. Metzinger (ed.), Consciouss Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
- McGinn, C. (1996). The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind (Second Edition). New York: Oxford University Press.
- McGinn, C. (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books.
- McGinn, C. (2003). “What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?” Philosophical Issues, 13: 148-162.
- McGinn, C. (2004). Consciousness and its objects. New York: Oxford University Press
- Perez, D. I. (2005). “Mysteries and Scandals. Transcendental Naturalism and the Future of Philosophy.” Critica, 37(110): 35-52.
- Whiteley, C. H. (1990). “McGinn on the Mind-Body Problem.” Mind, 99: 289.
Ayrıntılar
| Birincil Dil | İngilizce |
|---|---|
| Konular | Zihin Felsefesi |
| Bölüm | Araştırma/İnceleme Makaleleri |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 30 Aralık 2023 |
| Kabul Tarihi | 25 Aralık 2023 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2023 Cilt: 6 Sayı: 2 |
