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SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 1, 36 - 64, 31.07.2023
https://doi.org/10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882

Öz

Bu çalışma, siyasi iktidarların uyguladıkları seçim kazanma odaklı ekonomi politikaları nedeniyle ekonomide meydana gelen dalgalanmaları ifade eden politik konjonktür hareketlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmamızda öncelikle piyasa ekonomisinde kendiliğinden ortaya çıkan “iktisadi konjonktürel dalgalanmalar” ile devletin piyasa ekonomisine müdahalesi sonucu ortaya çıkan “politik konjonktürel dalgalanmalar” ayrımına bakacağız. Teorik literatürün kısa bir özetini sunacağız ve ardından sonuca dair bazı değerlendirmelerimizi takdim edeceğiz.

Kaynakça

  • Akerman, J. (1947). “Political Economic Cycles,” Kyklos, Vol 1, No 2, s. 107-117.
  • Aktan, C. C. & U Utkulu & S Togay, (1998). Nasıl Bir Para Sistemi, İstanbul: İMKB Yayını.
  • Aktan, C. C. (2022). “Makyavelizm, Herestetik ve Politik Manipülasyon Sanatı (Kamu Tercihi Perspektifinden “İyiliksever Despot” ve İktidar Hırsı)”, Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 14 (1) 89-108.
  • Alesina, A. (1987). “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 102, No 3, s. 651-678.
  • Alesina, A. (1989). “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies,” Economic Policy, Vol 4, No 8, s. 57-98.
  • Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Goandrnment and the Economy, Cambridge Uniandrsity Press, Cambridge.
  • Alesina, A. (1988); “Macroeconomics and Politics,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, (Der. Stanley Fischer), MIT Press, s. 13-62.
  • Alesina, A. ve J. Sachs (1988); “Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Cilt 20, Sayı 1, s. 63-82.
  • Alesina, A. & N.Roubini and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, MIT Press.
  • Alesina, A. G. D. Cohen ve N. Roubini (1992); “Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies,” Economics and Politics, Cilt 4, Sayı 1, s. 1-30.
  • Boix, C. (2000). “Partisan Goandrnments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960-93,” World Politics, Vol 53, No 1, s. 38-73.
  • Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2003). “Where Does the Political Budget Cycle Really Come from?,” CEPR Discussion Paper, No 4049, s. 1-26.
  • Briltan, S. (1969). Steering the Economy, Seeker & Warburg, London. Buchanan, J.M. (1958). Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin.
  • Buchanan, J.M. and R. E. Wagner, (1977). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (New York: Academic Press.
  • Buchanan, J.M. (1967). Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
  • Chappel, D. and D. A. Peel (1979). “On the Political Theory of the Business Cycle,” Economic Letters, Vol 2, No 4, s. 327-332.
  • Cukierman, A. and A. H. Meltzer (1986). “A Positiand Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Goandrnment and the Benefits of a Constitution,” Economic Inquiry, Vol 24, No 3, s. 367-388.
  • Çinko, L. (2005). “Modern Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Teorisi: Rasyonel Beklentileri İçeren Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri,” Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, No 19, s. 325-339.
  • De Groot, B. (2006). Essays on Economic Cycles. Nyenrode Business Universiteit, the Netherlands.
  • Dow, J. C. R. (1964). The Management of the British Economy, 1945-60, Cambridge University Press.
  • Downs, A. (1957a). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy, No 65, Vol 2, s. 135-150.
  • Downs, A. (1957b). An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper, New York.
  • Drazen, A. (2001a). “The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Vol 15, (Der.: Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff), MIT press, Cambridge, s. 75-138.
  • Drazen, A. (2001b). “The AFPM Model of the Political Business Cycle,” CEPR Working Paper, s. 1-26.
  • Dubois, E. (2016). “Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus,” Public Choice, Vol 166, No 1-2, s. 235-259.
  • Frey B. (1978). “Political Business Cycles” , in: James M. Buchanan et.all. 1978. Economics of Politics, London: IEA.
  • Garratt, D. (1998). “An Analysis of Political Business Cycle Theory and its Relationship with the New Political Macroeconomics,” Uniandrsity of Leicester, Papers in Economics, Vol 98, No 4, s. 1-49. Ginsburgh, V. and P. Michel (1983). “Random Timing of Elections and the Political Business Cycle,” Public Choice, Vol 40, No 2, s. 155-164.
  • Güdenoğlu, E. (2018). Türkiye’de Politik Konjonktür Dalgalanmalarının Analizi, Zonguldak Bülent Ecevit Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İktisat Anabilim Dalı, Doktora Tezi.
  • Hanusch, M. (2012). “Coalition Incentiands for Political Budget Cycles,” Public Choice, Vol 151, No 1-2, s. 121-136.
  • Hayek, F. A . von [1929]. 1933. Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
  • Hayek. F. A. von (1932). Monetary Theory And The Trade Cycle, New York, Harcourt Brace.
  • Hibbs, JR. D. A. (1977); “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy,” The American Political Science Review, Cilt 71, Sayı 4, s. 1467-1487.
  • Ito, T. (1990). “The Timing of Elections and Political Business Cycles in Japan,” Journal of Asian Fxonomics, Vol 1, No 1, s. 135-156.
  • Ito, T. and J. H. Park (1988). “Political Business Cycles in the Parliamentary System,” Economic Letters, Vol 27, No 3, s.233-238.
  • Juglar, C. (1862). Des Crises Commerciales Et De Leur Retour Périodique En France, En Angleterre Et Aux États-Unis. Cited in: Besomi, D. (2005) Clément Juglar And The Transition From Crises Theory To Business Cycle Theories. Paper Prepared For A Conference On The Occasion Of The Centenary Of The Death Of Clément Juglar, Paris.Online erişim: https://www.unil.ch/files/live/sites/cwp/files/users/neyguesi/public/D._Besomi_
  • Kalecki, M. (1943). Political Aspects of Full Employment. Political Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4, pp.322-330.
  • Keech, W. R. (1995). Economic Politics: The Cost of Democracy, Cambridge Uniandrsity Press, Cambridge.
  • Kiefer, D. (1997). Macroeconomic Policy and Public Choice, Springer Press, Berlin.
  • Kitchin, J. (1923). “Cycles and Trends in Economic Factors”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.5, No.1, pp.10-16.
  • Kondratieff, N.D. and Stolper, W.F. (1935). “The Long Waves in Economic Life”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.17, No.6, pp.105-115.
  • Kramer, G. H. (1971). “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964,” The American Political Science Review, Vol 65, No 1, s. 131-143.
  • Kuznets, S.S. (1930). “Equilibrium Economics and Business-Cycle Theory”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.44, No.3, pp.381-415.
  • Lachler, U. (1982). “On Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Dates,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol 17, No 1, s. 111-117.
  • Leertouwer, E. and P. Maier (2001). “Who Creates Political Business Cycles: Should Central Banks Be Blamed?,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 17, No 3, s. 445-463.
  • Lindbeck, A. (1976). “Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians,” The American Political Science Review, Vol 66, No 2, s. 1-19.
  • Lucas, Jr R. E. (1976). “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol 1, s. 19-46.
  • MacRae, C. D. (1977). “A Political Model of the Business Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol 85, No 2, s. 239-263.
  • Matthews, R. C. O. (1967). “Postwar Business Cycles in the UK”, in: M. Brsnowonfenbrenner (ed.), Is the Business Cycle Obsolete?, Wiley, New York.
  • Moore, H. M. (1914). Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause. The Macmillan Company, New York.; Su, V. (1996) Economic Fluctuations and Forecasting. Harper Collins College Publishers, New York.
  • Mueller, D. (Ed.). (1996). Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III, Cambridge Uniandrsity Press, Cambridge.
  • Nordhaus, W. D. (1975); “The Political Business Cycle,” The Review of Economic Studies, Cilt 42, Sayı 2, s. 169-190.
  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, Harwood Academic Publishers, Switzerland.
  • Prest, A. R. (1968). “Sense and Nonsense of Budgetary Policy”, Economic Journal, 78.
  • Price, S. (1997). “Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Surandy,” Public Choice, Vol 92, No 3-4, s. 407-427.
  • Richards, D. J. (1986); “Unanticipated Money and the Political Business Cycle,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Cilt 18, Sayı 4, s. 447-457.
  • Rogoff, K. (1990). “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” The American Economic Review, Vol 80, No 1, s. 21-36.
  • Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 55, No 1, s. 1-16.
  • Rose, S. (2006). “Do Fiscal Rules Dampen the Political Business Cycle?,” Public Choice, Vol 128, No 3-4, s. 407-431.
  • Schultz, K. A. (1995); “The Politics of the Political Business Cycle,” British Journal of Political Science, Cilt 25, Sayı 1, s. 79-99.
  • Schumpeter, J.A. (1939). Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical, And Statistical Analysis Of The Capitalist Process. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.
  • Snowdon, B. and H. R. Vane (2012). Modern Makroekonomi: Temelleri, Gelişimi and Bugünü, (Çeviri Editörü: Barış Kablamacı), Elif Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • Telatar, F. (2004). Politik İktisat Politikası, İmaj Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • Tollison R. D. and R.B. Ekelund, “Political Business Cycles” in: Economics, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1986. pp. 733-36. (Tercüme: C.C.Aktan, “Politik Konjonktür Dalgalanmaları”, içinde: C.C.Aktan, Anayasal İktisat, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2000.
  • Willett, T. D. and Keil, M. W. (2004). “Political Business Cycles”. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA.
  • Zarnowitz, V. (1992). Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Yıl 2023, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 1, 36 - 64, 31.07.2023
https://doi.org/10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882

Öz

Kaynakça

  • Akerman, J. (1947). “Political Economic Cycles,” Kyklos, Vol 1, No 2, s. 107-117.
  • Aktan, C. C. & U Utkulu & S Togay, (1998). Nasıl Bir Para Sistemi, İstanbul: İMKB Yayını.
  • Aktan, C. C. (2022). “Makyavelizm, Herestetik ve Politik Manipülasyon Sanatı (Kamu Tercihi Perspektifinden “İyiliksever Despot” ve İktidar Hırsı)”, Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt 14 (1) 89-108.
  • Alesina, A. (1987). “Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 102, No 3, s. 651-678.
  • Alesina, A. (1989). “Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies,” Economic Policy, Vol 4, No 8, s. 57-98.
  • Alesina, A. and H. Rosenthal (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Goandrnment and the Economy, Cambridge Uniandrsity Press, Cambridge.
  • Alesina, A. (1988); “Macroeconomics and Politics,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, (Der. Stanley Fischer), MIT Press, s. 13-62.
  • Alesina, A. ve J. Sachs (1988); “Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Cilt 20, Sayı 1, s. 63-82.
  • Alesina, A. & N.Roubini and G. D. Cohen (1997). Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy, MIT Press.
  • Alesina, A. G. D. Cohen ve N. Roubini (1992); “Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies,” Economics and Politics, Cilt 4, Sayı 1, s. 1-30.
  • Boix, C. (2000). “Partisan Goandrnments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960-93,” World Politics, Vol 53, No 1, s. 38-73.
  • Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2003). “Where Does the Political Budget Cycle Really Come from?,” CEPR Discussion Paper, No 4049, s. 1-26.
  • Briltan, S. (1969). Steering the Economy, Seeker & Warburg, London. Buchanan, J.M. (1958). Public Principles of Public Debt: A Defense and Restatement, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin.
  • Buchanan, J.M. and R. E. Wagner, (1977). Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (New York: Academic Press.
  • Buchanan, J.M. (1967). Public Finance in Democratic Process: Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
  • Chappel, D. and D. A. Peel (1979). “On the Political Theory of the Business Cycle,” Economic Letters, Vol 2, No 4, s. 327-332.
  • Cukierman, A. and A. H. Meltzer (1986). “A Positiand Theory of Discretionary Policy, the Cost of Democratic Goandrnment and the Benefits of a Constitution,” Economic Inquiry, Vol 24, No 3, s. 367-388.
  • Çinko, L. (2005). “Modern Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri Teorisi: Rasyonel Beklentileri İçeren Politik Konjonktür Hareketleri,” Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, No 19, s. 325-339.
  • De Groot, B. (2006). Essays on Economic Cycles. Nyenrode Business Universiteit, the Netherlands.
  • Dow, J. C. R. (1964). The Management of the British Economy, 1945-60, Cambridge University Press.
  • Downs, A. (1957a). “An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy,” Journal of Political Economy, No 65, Vol 2, s. 135-150.
  • Downs, A. (1957b). An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper, New York.
  • Drazen, A. (2001a). “The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Vol 15, (Der.: Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff), MIT press, Cambridge, s. 75-138.
  • Drazen, A. (2001b). “The AFPM Model of the Political Business Cycle,” CEPR Working Paper, s. 1-26.
  • Dubois, E. (2016). “Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus,” Public Choice, Vol 166, No 1-2, s. 235-259.
  • Frey B. (1978). “Political Business Cycles” , in: James M. Buchanan et.all. 1978. Economics of Politics, London: IEA.
  • Garratt, D. (1998). “An Analysis of Political Business Cycle Theory and its Relationship with the New Political Macroeconomics,” Uniandrsity of Leicester, Papers in Economics, Vol 98, No 4, s. 1-49. Ginsburgh, V. and P. Michel (1983). “Random Timing of Elections and the Political Business Cycle,” Public Choice, Vol 40, No 2, s. 155-164.
  • Güdenoğlu, E. (2018). Türkiye’de Politik Konjonktür Dalgalanmalarının Analizi, Zonguldak Bülent Ecevit Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İktisat Anabilim Dalı, Doktora Tezi.
  • Hanusch, M. (2012). “Coalition Incentiands for Political Budget Cycles,” Public Choice, Vol 151, No 1-2, s. 121-136.
  • Hayek, F. A . von [1929]. 1933. Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
  • Hayek. F. A. von (1932). Monetary Theory And The Trade Cycle, New York, Harcourt Brace.
  • Hibbs, JR. D. A. (1977); “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy,” The American Political Science Review, Cilt 71, Sayı 4, s. 1467-1487.
  • Ito, T. (1990). “The Timing of Elections and Political Business Cycles in Japan,” Journal of Asian Fxonomics, Vol 1, No 1, s. 135-156.
  • Ito, T. and J. H. Park (1988). “Political Business Cycles in the Parliamentary System,” Economic Letters, Vol 27, No 3, s.233-238.
  • Juglar, C. (1862). Des Crises Commerciales Et De Leur Retour Périodique En France, En Angleterre Et Aux États-Unis. Cited in: Besomi, D. (2005) Clément Juglar And The Transition From Crises Theory To Business Cycle Theories. Paper Prepared For A Conference On The Occasion Of The Centenary Of The Death Of Clément Juglar, Paris.Online erişim: https://www.unil.ch/files/live/sites/cwp/files/users/neyguesi/public/D._Besomi_
  • Kalecki, M. (1943). Political Aspects of Full Employment. Political Quarterly, Vol.14, No.4, pp.322-330.
  • Keech, W. R. (1995). Economic Politics: The Cost of Democracy, Cambridge Uniandrsity Press, Cambridge.
  • Kiefer, D. (1997). Macroeconomic Policy and Public Choice, Springer Press, Berlin.
  • Kitchin, J. (1923). “Cycles and Trends in Economic Factors”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.5, No.1, pp.10-16.
  • Kondratieff, N.D. and Stolper, W.F. (1935). “The Long Waves in Economic Life”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.17, No.6, pp.105-115.
  • Kramer, G. H. (1971). “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964,” The American Political Science Review, Vol 65, No 1, s. 131-143.
  • Kuznets, S.S. (1930). “Equilibrium Economics and Business-Cycle Theory”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.44, No.3, pp.381-415.
  • Lachler, U. (1982). “On Political Business Cycles with Endogenous Election Dates,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol 17, No 1, s. 111-117.
  • Leertouwer, E. and P. Maier (2001). “Who Creates Political Business Cycles: Should Central Banks Be Blamed?,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 17, No 3, s. 445-463.
  • Lindbeck, A. (1976). “Stabilization Policy in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians,” The American Political Science Review, Vol 66, No 2, s. 1-19.
  • Lucas, Jr R. E. (1976). “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol 1, s. 19-46.
  • MacRae, C. D. (1977). “A Political Model of the Business Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol 85, No 2, s. 239-263.
  • Matthews, R. C. O. (1967). “Postwar Business Cycles in the UK”, in: M. Brsnowonfenbrenner (ed.), Is the Business Cycle Obsolete?, Wiley, New York.
  • Moore, H. M. (1914). Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause. The Macmillan Company, New York.; Su, V. (1996) Economic Fluctuations and Forecasting. Harper Collins College Publishers, New York.
  • Mueller, D. (Ed.). (1996). Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mueller, D. C. (2003). Public Choice III, Cambridge Uniandrsity Press, Cambridge.
  • Nordhaus, W. D. (1975); “The Political Business Cycle,” The Review of Economic Studies, Cilt 42, Sayı 2, s. 169-190.
  • Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics, Harwood Academic Publishers, Switzerland.
  • Prest, A. R. (1968). “Sense and Nonsense of Budgetary Policy”, Economic Journal, 78.
  • Price, S. (1997). “Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Surandy,” Public Choice, Vol 92, No 3-4, s. 407-427.
  • Richards, D. J. (1986); “Unanticipated Money and the Political Business Cycle,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Cilt 18, Sayı 4, s. 447-457.
  • Rogoff, K. (1990). “Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles,” The American Economic Review, Vol 80, No 1, s. 21-36.
  • Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988). “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles,” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 55, No 1, s. 1-16.
  • Rose, S. (2006). “Do Fiscal Rules Dampen the Political Business Cycle?,” Public Choice, Vol 128, No 3-4, s. 407-431.
  • Schultz, K. A. (1995); “The Politics of the Political Business Cycle,” British Journal of Political Science, Cilt 25, Sayı 1, s. 79-99.
  • Schumpeter, J.A. (1939). Business Cycles. A Theoretical, Historical, And Statistical Analysis Of The Capitalist Process. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.
  • Snowdon, B. and H. R. Vane (2012). Modern Makroekonomi: Temelleri, Gelişimi and Bugünü, (Çeviri Editörü: Barış Kablamacı), Elif Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • Telatar, F. (2004). Politik İktisat Politikası, İmaj Yayınevi, Ankara.
  • Tollison R. D. and R.B. Ekelund, “Political Business Cycles” in: Economics, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1986. pp. 733-36. (Tercüme: C.C.Aktan, “Politik Konjonktür Dalgalanmaları”, içinde: C.C.Aktan, Anayasal İktisat, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2000.
  • Willett, T. D. and Keil, M. W. (2004). “Political Business Cycles”. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA.
  • Zarnowitz, V. (1992). Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Toplam 66 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar

Coşkun Can Aktan 0000-0003-4294-2314

Erdem Güdenoğlu

Erken Görünüm Tarihi 10 Temmuz 2023
Yayımlanma Tarihi 31 Temmuz 2023
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2023 Cilt: 15 Sayı: 1

Kaynak Göster

APA Aktan, C. C., & Güdenoğlu, E. (2023). SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ. Sosyal Ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, 15(1), 36-64. https://doi.org/10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882
AMA Aktan CC, Güdenoğlu E. SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ. Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi. Temmuz 2023;15(1):36-64. doi:10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882
Chicago Aktan, Coşkun Can, ve Erdem Güdenoğlu. “SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ Ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ”. Sosyal Ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi 15, sy. 1 (Temmuz 2023): 36-64. https://doi.org/10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882.
EndNote Aktan CC, Güdenoğlu E (01 Temmuz 2023) SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ. Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi 15 1 36–64.
IEEE C. C. Aktan ve E. Güdenoğlu, “SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ”, Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, c. 15, sy. 1, ss. 36–64, 2023, doi: 10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882.
ISNAD Aktan, Coşkun Can - Güdenoğlu, Erdem. “SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ Ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ”. Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi 15/1 (Temmuz 2023), 36-64. https://doi.org/10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882.
JAMA Aktan CC, Güdenoğlu E. SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ. Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi. 2023;15:36–64.
MLA Aktan, Coşkun Can ve Erdem Güdenoğlu. “SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ Ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ”. Sosyal Ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, c. 15, sy. 1, 2023, ss. 36-64, doi:10.55978/sobiadsbd.1235882.
Vancouver Aktan CC, Güdenoğlu E. SEÇİM EKONOMİSİ ve POLİTİK KONJONKTÜR HAREKETLERİ TEORİSİ. Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi. 2023;15(1):36-64.